Essays in regulation of pharmaceutical markets by Méndez, Susan Johanna
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2013
Essays in regulation of pharmaceutical markets
Méndez, Susan Johanna
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-141988
Originally published at:
Méndez, Susan Johanna. Essays in regulation of pharmaceutical markets. 2013, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Essays in Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets
Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of Economics,
Business Administration and Information Technology
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Management and Economics
presented by
Susan Johanna Me´ndez Vera
from Switzerland (Stallikon, ZH) and Colombia
approved in October 2013 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Kaiser
Prof. Dr. Armin Schmutzler
The Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology of the
University of Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating
an opinion of the views expressed in the work.
Zurich, 23.10.2013
Chairman of the Doctoral Board: Prof. Dr. Josef Zweimu¨ller

Acknowledgements
In writing this dissertation I benefited much from the interaction with a number of people
who deserve and have my appreciation.
First and foremost, I am grateful to my advisor Uli Kaiser for his support and en-
couragement during the whole time of my dissertation. I greatly appreciate his generosity
and his efforts in making this a successful project. I am also specially thankful to Armin
Schmutzler for having my back in repeated occasions and for co-advising my thesis.
I am most indebted to Dani Halbheer, with whom I have had the pleasure to spend
many instructive and amusing coffee breaks. I would like to thank him for his constant
support, his helpful advice, and for reading and commenting on many of my drafts.
Many thanks go to my coauthors: Thomas Rønde, for hosting me in Copenhagen in
severals occasions and to Hannes Ullrich, whom I owe the answers to a good deal of ques-
tions. It was a great opportunity to learn from them and a pleasure to work with them. I
also want to thank Michelle Sovinsky for all the inspiring discussions and for bringing me
closer to the Empirical IO community. Special thanks go to my colleagues Donja Darai,
Nicole Ehrsam, Dennis Ga¨rtner, Betti Klose, and Michael Ribbers for all the joy and cake
they brought into the office.
Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my family for their unconditional help and to
my partner Kevin Staub for his patience, his encouragement, and his constant and caring
support. Without his love none of this would have been possible.
i
ii
Contents
List of Tables viii
1 Introduction 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals: The Danish Market for Statins 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 The Danish Pharmaceutical Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Industry Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.1 Demand Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.2 Supply Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 Counterfactual Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.4 Consumer Surplus and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.1 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.2 Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.3 The Impact of Parallel Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
iii
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tables and Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices:
Evidence from a Reference Price Reform in Denmark 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 The Danish market for pharmaceutical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.1 Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2 Reduced-form Price Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.1 Demand Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.2 Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.3 Reform Effects on Prices, Demand, and Consumer Surplus . . . . . 69
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Tables and Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4 How Do Drug Prices Respond to a Change from External to Internal
Reference Pricing? Evidence from a Danish Regulatory Reform 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
iv
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Tables and Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
v
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Danish Market for Statins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Average Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Average Sales, Average Revenues, and Average Expenditures . . 37
2.4 Demand Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Average Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Average Marginal Cost and Average Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Average Change in Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Average Change in Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.9 Average Change in Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.10 Changes in Profits and Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.11 Average Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.12 Average Yearly Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Prices and sales for statins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Logit and random coefficient logit demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Price Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Reform effects on market shares, expenditures, and consumer wel-
fare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1 Market Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
vii
4.3 Estimation Results – Anti-Cholesterol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4 Estimation Results – Antiulcerants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5 Estimation Results – Antibiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Pharmaceuticals play a key role in working towards achieving the “human right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.1” As
required by the United Nations, governmental health care agencies attempt to provide inno-
vative, safe, effective, and affordable pharmaceuticals given their financial resources. Cost
containment policies to influence consumers’ purchase decisions, physicians’ prescription
behavior, and firms’ pricing strategies have been widely used to control public budgets in
health care systems, but preventing rises in expenditures has proven to be a difficult task.
Reasons are e.g. an aging population, the introduction of new and expensive medicines and
treatments, a strongly represented and influential pharmaceutical industry, and consumers’
low price sensitivity due to insurance coverage.
This dissertation empirically examines two highly debated topics in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. The first chapter analyzes the argument that parallel trade promotes price
competition and generates substantial savings to consumers as well as to the government,
which is the provider of public health insurance. The second and the third chapters ex-
plore the effects of reference pricing, a regulatory policy widely used in Europe to control
expenditures for pharmaceuticals.
1As stated in the preamble of the 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization and Article 25. of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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Chapter 1 investigates parallel trade, a practice where products are legally marketed
in one country but distributed in another country without authorization of the property
rights holder. Parallel trade deals with topics in the related fields of international trade,
intellectual property, and competition policy. Opponents of parallel trade argue that paral-
lel imports weaken intellectual property protection, thereby reducing innovation incentives
(Li and Maskus 2006, Szymanski and Valletti 2006, and Valletti 2006). On the other hand,
politicians and regulatory agencies alike typically propose parallel trade to promote (price)
competition (Ganslandt and Maskus 2004), which generates savings to consumers and
insurers. In an attempt to reduce high prices for pharmaceutical products, the European
Union has allowed parallel imports within its area. The aim of this chapter is to investigate
and empirically quantify the impact of parallel trade in markets for pharmaceuticals.
The first part of Chapter 1 develops a structural model of demand and supply (Berry
1994) using Danish data on prices, sales and characteristics of medicines used in the treat-
ment of hypercholesterolemia (presence of high levels of cholesterol in the blood). These
products are top selling medicines worldwide in terms of volume and revenue. Furthermore,
the Danish pharmaceutical market provides a clean empirical setting to study these effects
due to its unique market structure and the availability of very rich data. The second part
of the chapter uses the estimates of the model parameters from the first part and provides
a framework to simulate outcomes under a complete ban of parallel imports, keeping other
regulatory schemes unchanged.
There are two sets of key results from prohibiting parallel imports. The first set focuses
on price effects, which differ substantially along two dimensions: the patent protection
status of the molecule (on-patent or off-patent) and the type of the firm (original firms,
generic firms, and parallel importers). On average, prices increase more in markets where
the molecule is off-patent. On the other dimension, both generic firms and original pro-
ducers increase their pharmacy purchase prices when competition from parallel importers
is removed.
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The second set of empirical results reports the effects on market participants. My
model takes into consideration consumers’ preferences allowing them to substitute between
products. Prohibiting parallel imports induces consumers to substitute towards original
products for which they have stronger preferences. Removing parallel imports leads to
(i) an increase in profits for original producers and a decrease for generic firms, (ii) an
increase in consumers expenditures and governmental health care expenditures, and (iii)
to an overall decrease in welfare driven by a decrease in consumer surplus.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 examine the effects of reference pricing, a particularly widely
embraced tool to control expenditures (Lo´pez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000). With
this approach the maximum reimbursement obtained by a consumer is determined using
prices of similar drugs as reference. Reference pricing aims at benefiting patients that
prefer cheaper products over more expensive ones. Thus, inducing more price sensitivity
on consumers and competitive pressure on firms.
While existing studies have shown that reference pricing effectively curtails prices of
prescription drugs (Aronsson et al. 2001; Brekke et al. 2009, 2011; Kanavos et al. 2008;
Pavcnik 2002; Puig-Junoy 2007), a hitherto empirically unanswered issue is to what extent
differences in the design of reference pricing systems affect market outcomes. Specifically,
we study the effects of a change from an “external” (based on a basket of prices in other
countries) to an “internal” (based on comparable domestic products) reference price system.
We address that question by exploiting a reform in Denmark, a country that switched from
external to internal reference pricing in April 2005.
Chapter 2 conducts a thorough analysis of the reform effects on market participants
using data on anti-cholesterol products. Specifically, we first estimate a flexible logit-type
demand model (Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995) that allows for both horizontal and vertical
product differentiation, as well as for consumer-specific heterogeneity that determines sub-
stitution patterns between products. Second, we estimate pricing equations to predict the
counterfactual prices of products had the reform taken place before it actually did. Finally,
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we use our estimated pricing and structural demand parameters to compute a counterfac-
tual demand which allows us to calculate total changes in demand, consumer expenditures,
producer revenues as well as consumer welfare.
We find that while our estimated consumer compensating variation is small, the reform
led to substantial reductions in pharmacy purchase prices and reference prices as well as
in copayment prices —the final price paid by consumers—, and to sizeable decreases in
overall producer revenues, health care expenditures, and consumer expenditures. These
effects differ markedly between original products, generic products, and parallel imports,
with health care expenditures and producer revenues decreasing and consumer expenditures
increasing most for original products. The reform also induced consumers to substitute
from original products — for which they have strong preferences — to generics and parallel
imports. This substitution also explains the small increase in consumer welfare despite a
substantial decrease in expenditures.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis to other pharmaceuticals and focuses only on price
effects of the reform. Specifically, we use Danish data on the following three therapeutic
markets that differ in the severity of the condition: For the treatment of a chronic condition
we continue using anti-cholesterol drugs, for a semi-chronic condition we use antiulcerants,
and for the treatment of an acute condition we use antibiotics.
We expect the intensity of the effects from the reform to differ between these thera-
peutic groups because patients with a chronic condition generally face higher health care
expenditures, their treatment time is longer and they might be more experienced and better
informed about their substitution options.
We base our analysis in Pavcnik (2002). Our results show that the switch from external
to internal reference pricing led to a substantial reduction in pharmacy purchase prices.
Moreover, the effects are stronger for the chronic condition than for the acute condition and
the reform affects generic firms and parallel importers more than original firms. Finally,
we find that the reform reinforces the effects of competition, specially for generic firms.
4
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Chapter 2
Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals:
The Danish Market for Statins
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2.1 Introduction
Parallel trade refers to the practice where products are legally marketed in one country
but distributed in another country without authorization of the property rights holder. In
the European market for pharmaceuticals, governmental health care agencies attempt to
provide innovative, safe, effective and affordable pharmaceuticals keeping their financial
resources. To reach this goal different regulatory policies across nations are in use. How-
ever, it has been argued that these differences in regulatory strategies generate significant
price dispersion and hence induce arbitrage opportunities and a profitable market for par-
allel trade (Danzon 1998, Danzon and Chao 2000). Whether or not parallel imports in
the pharmaceutical industry are beneficial for market participants has been an intensely
debated issue. Opponents of parallel trade argue that parallel imports weaken intellectual
property protection and therefore firms have less incentives to innovate, which generates
dynamic inefficiency. Supporters on the other hand emphasize that allowing parallel trade
benefits consumers because it increases competition leading to lower prices, which in turn
generates savings to consumers and insurers. In an attempt to reduce high prices for phar-
maceutical products, the European Union has allowed parallel imports within its area.1
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of parallel trade in markets for
pharmaceuticals. More specifically, this paper attempts to identify and understand the
effects of parallel imports on consumers’ consumption choices, government expenditures
for pharmaceuticals, and producers’ strategies.
I empirically quantify these effects on the market participants using data on prices,
sales and characteristics of statins in Denmark. Statins are used in the treatment of
hypercholesterolemia—presence of high levels of cholesterol in the blood—, a chronic con-
dition that, if left unattended, can have severe consequences like heart attacks and strokes,
which are both leading causes of death in developed countries. The best known statins sell
1The United States currently referred bill S.319, Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act
of 2011, to Senate committee on 2/10/2011 to allow parallel imports.
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under the tradename Lipitor (by Pfizer) and Zocor (by MSD Sharp & Dohme) and are top
selling medicines worldwide in terms of volume and revenue. The Danish pharmaceutical
market provides a clean empirical setting to study these effects due to its unique market
structure and the availability of very rich data. A particularly attractive feature of my data
is that it allows me to distinguish between the price set by the firm, the price set by the
pharmacy, and the price paid by consumers.
The paper consists of two parts. The first part develops and estimates a structural model
of demand and supply under current regulation laws and market structure. The second
part uses estimates of the model parameters and the provided framework to construct
counterfactuals allowing a welfare evaluation under a complete ban of parallel imports.
Eliminating parallel trade yields the following results. First, a prohibition of parallel
trade reduces average prices but results in higher prices for both original products and
generic products. Second, eliminating parallel trade leads to substitution from parallel
imported products towards original products. Third, consumer expenditures as well as
government expenditures increase absent parallel trade. Finally, banning parallel imports
reduces consumer surplus and increases firm profits, leading to an overall decrease in wel-
fare.
Finally, while beyond the scope of this paper, the long-term effects of parallel trade,
particularly on generating dynamic inefficiencies that can reduce welfare, remain a highly
controversial and unresolved question. Because the industry heavily relies on R&D and
innovation is an important driver of consumer welfare, the subject constitutes an important
issue for further research.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of the relevant liter-
ature. Section 2.3 offers an overview of the Danish pharmaceutical market. Section 4.3
describes the data. Section 2.5 describes the empirical framework and describes the sim-
ulation strategy. Section 4.5 presents the results and welfare implications. Section 4.6
concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
This section offers a summary of the literature on parallel imports. First, I present the legal
framework on parallel trade in the European Union. Next, I review the literature that has
address parallel imports in the pharmaceutical industry from an economics perspective.
A Legal Perspective
Parallel trade deals with topics in three related fields: intellectual property law, interna-
tional trade, and competition law.2
International research intensive firms rely strongly on intellectual property rights to pro-
tect their investments. One important policy is the legal principle of exhaustion of patent
rights, which determines the markets where the property right owner can prevent unautho-
rized trade. Under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS) each country is free to determine a national or an international policy of ex-
haustion of patent rights (Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement). The European Union has
adopted a policy of community exhaustion, such that property right owners can prevent
resale of products first sold outside the area but cannot interfere in the trade of its products
within members states of the European Union.
Furthermore, in an effort to achieve and protect an European Common Market the
European Commission and the European Court of Justice strictly enforce the principle of
free movement of goods within the European Union (Article 28 of the consolidated version
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).
Original firms have used different strategies to limit parallel trade, like challenging
restrictive distribution agreements with wholesalers, setting supply restrictions in exporter
countries or challenging trademark protection3 but parallel trade within the European
2See Kyle (2009) for an overview of the literature related to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals
3See for example: GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission of the European Communities
Case C-501/06, 2009 ECR I-9291; GlaxoGroup Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd. & Anor Case HC 03 00464, 2003
10
Union has been enabled and protected through these laws, that prioritize the principle of
a Common Market over the possible welfare looses generated through reduced incentives
to innovate. More recent cases have shed light into the importance of considering dynamic
inefficiencies (Petrucci 2010, Tsouloufas 2011) and the necessity of revising the goals of the
EU competition laws.
An Economic Perspective
Most of the empirical studies on parallel imports in the pharmaceutical industry have
almost exclusively focused on price effects. For instance, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004)
use a regulatory change after Sweden joined the European Union in 1995. They estimate
a 19 percent price reduction due to parallel imports for the top 50 molecules in Sweden.4
In contrast, Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) study six molecules during 1997 to 2002 in 11
European countries. They do not attribute price decreases in import countries to parallel
trade, but rather to generic substitution and find evidence for entry of parallel importers to
be determined by price differences between countries. A more related study is Enemark et
al. (2006). The authors use data on four European countries including the top 50 products
in Denmark in 2004. Following the strategy of West and Mahon (2003) they find that
parallel trade generated 168 million Danish krones savings. My results contribute to the
view that parallel trade does generate substantial savings to consumers and health care
agencies, however the magnitude of the savings is much higher (on average 242.6 million
Danish krones) than the results in Enemark et al. even when my sample includes only two
of their products.
Another issue investigated is the fact that given the heavily regulated industry, firms
are usually limited in their price setting strategies to compete with parallel trade. The
only empirical paper that studies non-price responses to parallel trade is Kyle (2011). Her
EWHC 2015; Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm Case C-1 02/77, 1978 ECR 1139.
4A molecule in this context is the active ingredient of a pharmaceutical product defined by its bottom-
level Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification code.
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study reveals that firms are indeed using other strategies to hinder parallel trade, typically
differentiating products across countries by altering the brand name, dosage form, and
strength.
The theoretical literature has gone beyond studying price effects and explore the im-
pact of parallel trade on R&D. Li and Maskus (2006), Szymanski and Valletti (2006),
and Valletti (2006) conclude that parallel imports have detrimental effects on incentives
to innovate in the long run but can be beneficial to consumers in the short run. However,
Grossman and Lai (2008) show that allowing international parallel trade can benefit inno-
vation, since governments will use different price control tools if international parallel trade
were permitted. This issue, while beyond the scope of my paper, is still a relevant question.
2.3 The Danish Pharmaceutical Industry
This section offers an overview of the pharmaceutical industry and discusses the main
regulatory framework in effect during the time period covered by my data (May 2003 to
March 2005).
2.3.1 Industry Description
The pharmaceutical industry in Denmark has a typical vertical structure. First, at the
upstream level there are three types of firms: Original firms, generic firms, and parallel
importers. Original firms engage in R&D and manufacture new medicines using intellectual
property rights to protect their innovations. Generics firms produce bioequivalent copies of
original products and are only allowed to enter the market after the relevant patents have
expired. In contrast, parallel importers do not engage in manufacturing. Instead, they
supply products that are imported from markets outside of Denmark. Typically, parallel
importers repackage, relabel, and redistribute (original and generic) products. Since 1990,
parallel imports are legal in Denmark—even for products under patent protection.
12
Original
Firms
Generic
Firms
Parallel
Importers
p f
Pharmacies
pc, pcop
Consumers
(Patients)
Figure 2.1: Overview of vertical industry structure
Second, at the wholesale level, pharmacies purchase pharmaceuticals from upstream
firms that are supplied to consumers (patients). Pharmacies operate in a highly regulated
market environment, as I detail below. The most important features of the regulation are:
generic substitution and retail price regulation.
Finally, at the downstream level, consumers purchase prescription-only pharmaceuti-
cals from the pharmacies. At the consumer level, the regulator implemented a system
of reference pricing that sets reimbursement rules. Importantly, the reimbursement price
determines copayment prices, which govern consumers’ purchase decision. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates the vertical structure.
2.3.2 Regulatory Framework
Governmental safety concerns and budget constrains generate a high degree of regulation
on pharmaceutical markets. In Europe, price regulation and reimbursement rules of phar-
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maceuticals is a national competence. Denmark’s regulatory body has adopted a policy of
free pricing at the upstream level. However, the upstream firms must report their prices
to the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA). Every second week, the DKMA updates prices
and product availability in a publicly available list. This list is used by doctors when
issuing prescriptions, by hospitals for their electronic patient records, by pharmacies to en-
sure availability of products, and by consumers to obtain information about (copayment)
prices of available substitutes. Next, I discuss pharmacy regulation and follow it with a
description of the reimbursement rules that determine copayment prices.
Pharmacy Regulation
Pharmacies face two types of regulation: generic substitution and retail price regulation.
Danish pharmacists are required by law to dispense the cheapest product among available
substitutes, unless the consumer or the doctor explicitly requests another product. Generic
substitution for off-patent products has been encouraged since 1991.
Pharmacy retail prices pc for prescription-only pharmaceuticals are identical nationwide
and can be decomposed as follows:
pc = µpf + k, (2.1)
where pf is the pharmacy purchase price (at the wholesale level), µ is the regulated markup
above the pharmacy purchase price, and k is the prescription fee (including value added
tax).5 Notice that, in effect, retail price regulation determines pharmacies’ unit margins.
Reimbursement Rules
The final price paid by consumers is the copayment price, that is, the pharmacy retail price
adjusted for reimbursement. Specifically, the copayment price pcop is given by:
pcop = pc − 0.8 ∗ pr, (2.2)
5The exact rules and yearly adjustments to compute pharmacy retail prices from pharmacy purchase
prices are detailed in Appendix A.
14
where pc is the pharmacy retail price and pr is the reference price. The reference price in a
given substitution group is set equal to the lowest price of the Danish pharmacy retail price
and the average price in EU-15 (excluding Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal). The
80% reimbursement of the reference price applies for consumers with yearly expenditures
exceeding 2,950 Danish krones (DKK) (e 395).6
Substitution groups are defined by DKMA guidelines. Products are assigned to the same
substitution group if they have the same active ingredient, administration form, strength,
and similar package size. Importantly, consumers can freely choose among products in the
same substitution group.
This reimbursement rule, while allowing consumers some freedom in their choices,
does influence consumers’ price sensitivity by covering only a fraction of their expendi-
tures. Therefore, reference pricing is a widely used measure for cost containment (Lo´pez-
Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000; Esp´ın et al. 2011).7 Brekke et al. (2007, 2009, 2011),
Kaiser et al. (2013), and Pavcnik (2002) empirically investigate the impact of reference
pricing on consumers and government expenditures.
2.4 The Data
I use data from the market of statins during the time period May 2003 to March 2005. Price
data and product characteristics were obtained from DKMA. Sales data was made available
from the Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (LIF). I observe fortnightly
prices and sales for 213 products sold in Denmark, which belong to the molecules in the
therapeutic group of HMG CoA reductase inhibitors (commonly known as statins).
6The medical condition explored below is a chronic condition for which this minimum expenditure is
reached.
7The WHO Collaborating Centre for Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies (online access
at http://whocc.goeg.at) offers an overview of the countries that currently use reference pricing to control
expenditures.
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A product is defined by four attributes: active substance, strength, package size, and
firm. The active substance is captured by the molecule classified by the 5-level ATC code.
Strength measures the amount of the active substance in milligram per pill. Package size
is simply the number of pills per package.
There are six molecules, out of which three are off-patent (Simvastatin, Lovastatin, and
Pravastatin). The other molecules are on-patent (Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin, and Rosu-
vastatin). Table 2.1 provides an overview and indicates the ATC codes. In addition, the
table provides information about brand names, patent owners and the average number of
firms and products in each molecule. The best known statins sell under the tradenames
Lipitor (Pfizer) and Zocor (MSD Sharp & Dohme) and are top selling medicines in terms
of quantity and revenue.
Generic firms sell version of the first three molecules (C10AA01-C10AA03). In con-
trast, the molecules Fluvastatin (C10AA04), Atorvastatin (C10AA05), and Rosuvastatin
(C10AA07) are protected by an active patent and sold by original firms. Importantly there
is more than one active firm in these groups because of the presence of parallel importers.
To make different products comparable I normalize prices and quantities using defined
daily doses (DDD). This measure is proposed by the World Health Organization and widely
used in the pharmaceutical industry.
Table 2.2 shows average pharmacy purchase prices pf , pharmacy retail prices pc, refer-
ence prices pr and copayment prices pcop. All prices are deflated using consumer price index
with 2005 as basis year. The summary is organized as follows: Part A shows averages for
all products, Part B presents the results by molecule, Part C by firm type, and Part D by
the patent status. Pharmacies buy one DDD for around DKK 6 (around e 0.80) and con-
sumers copayment is on average DKK 3.2 (e 0.40). As noted in Kanavos and Costa-Font
(2005), pharmacy purchase price for parallel imports lies just below the price for original
firms and significantly above generic prices. Copayments seem to be substantially higher
for original products than for parallel imports or generics. Also, consumers pay more for
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off-patent products than for on-patent products. This is due to the reimbursement rules
and the lack of substitutes in the on-patent segment.
Finally, Table 2.3 summarizes average sales and revenues, and expenditures. Fortnightly
sales are in volume and amount to about 2.4 million DDD on average for a period of 14-
days. The most popular products are Simvastatin (C10AA01) and Atorvastatin (C10AA05)
selling fortnightly on average around 1.7 million DDD and 0.5 million DDD respectively.
Furthermore, most sales come from generic products. Revenues are calculated as pharmacy
purchase price times sold DDDs. The statins markets generates fortnightly on average
DKK 9 million. Original firms account for the highest revenues, while revenues for generics
and parallel imports are substantially lower. Government expenditures are reimbursement
costs and amount to DKK 10.3 million on average for a period of 14-days. Finally, con-
sumers pay only a fraction of their cost (copayment price times consumed DDDs). Their
expenditures are fortnightly on average DKK 3.3 million.
2.5 Empirical Framework
The empirical framework has two main components: demand estimation and supply esti-
mation. The estimation draws on Berry (1994), Stern (1996), and Verboven (1996), and is
closely related to recent work by Branstetter et al. (2011), Dutta (2011), and Dunn (2012).
The first part of this paper specifies a discrete choice model to estimate consumer demand.
These estimates are used in the second part to recover the marginal cost of production
from the firms’ profit maximizing conditions. Ultimately, the goal of the analysis is to use
the estimates to generate policy implications from a hypothetical ban of parallel imports.
2.5.1 Demand Estimation
I consider a market with a set of consumers that are indexed by i. Each consumer chooses
the product j (j = 1, . . . , J) that maximizes her utility Uij. Consumer choice has a nested
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logit structure (Berry 1994). The nests (g = 1, . . . , G) follow from substitution groups
defined by the DKMA. Importantly, consumers can freely choose among products in the
same substitution group.8
The utility of a consumer as a function of observed and unobserved product character-
istics is:
Uij = Xjβ − αpcopj + ξj +
∑
g
[djgζig] + (1− σ)εij. (2.3)
The terms that are invariant across consumers are captured by mean utility δj ≡ Xjβ −
αpcopj +ξj, which depends on observed product characteristics Xj, copayment price p
cop
j and
product characteristics ξj (that are unobserved to the econometrician).
The nesting structure is reflected in djg, a dummy equal to one if product j belongs
to the set of products J in nest g (Jg) and zero otherwise. ζig is common to all products
in nest g and its distribution depends on the nesting parameter σ. The random utility
term εij represents unobserved consumer-specific heterogeneity. Each εij is assumed to
be identically, independently distributed extreme value across consumers and products.
Cardell (1997) shows that if εij is i.i.d. extreme value, then ζig + (1 − σ)εij is also an
extreme value random variable.
The nesting parameter measures correlation of consumer choices between substitution
groups. Products are considered closer substitutes the closer σ gets to one. If σ = 1 the
model reduces to a simple logit model where there is perfect substitutability of products
between nests. On the contrary, if σ = 0 there is no substitution across nests. McFadden
(1978) shows that for the nested logit to be consistent with random-utility maximization,
the estimated value for σ must lie between 0 and 1.
The model also includes one nest that is explicitly modeled as the outside option. It
allows consumers with high cholesterol to be treated with drugs other than statins or
where no medication but rather life style changes like more sports and a low-fat diet are
8Consumers can choose a product that belongs to a different substitution group only after consulting
the practitioner. I allow for this possibility in my estimation.
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recommended. In absence of the outside option a change in prices of the inside goods,
statins, will not have an effect on aggregate output. The price of the outside good is
assumed not to be set in response to the prices of the inside goods and its mean utility is
normalized to zero (δ0 ≡ 0).
If each consumer selects the product that provides them with the highest utility and
using the distributional assumptions, Berry (1994) shows how to solve for mean utility
levels as a function of observed market shares. The market share of product j sj can be
decomposed as follows:
sj(δ, σ) = sj|g(δ, σ)sg(δ, σ), (2.4)
where sj|g is the share of product j in nest g and sg is the share of nest g in the market.
Following Berry (1994), these terms are:
sj|g(δ, σ) =
exp(δj/(1− σ))
Dg
and sg(δ, σ) =
D
(1−σ)
g∑
gD
(1−σ))
g
,
where Dg is:
Dg ≡
∑
j∈Jg
exp(δj/(1− σ)).
The nest containing the outside good has only one element (Do = 1), thus the market
share of the outside good is:
so(δ, σ) =
1∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
.
Finally, solving for mean utility levels the linear equation to be estimated is:
ln(sj)− ln(so) = Xjβ − αpcopj + σln(sj|g) + ξj. (2.5)
The variables included in the vector of observed product characteristics are the strength,
package size, a dummy variable indicating if the product is on-patent and the number
of products in the same nest. I further include firm and time period dummy variables
in the specification. More important, I obtain the coefficient on price α and the nesting
parameter σ. These are the parameters that will determine elasticities of demand and
thereby influence the substitution patterns of consumers and the price setting of firms. My
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prior is that α has a negative sign such that higher prices are associated with a decrease
in mean utility. The nesting parameter σ should lie between 0 and 1 to be consistent with
random-utility maximization.
Instrumental Variables
To control for endogeneity arising from potential correlation between unobserved product
characteristics and pcopj and sj|g Berry et al. (1995) propose the use of characteristics of
other firms as valid instruments. Since characteristics of product k are not included in
the utility function for product j but are correlated with the price and conditional shares
of product j through the markup in the first-order conditions of the profit maximizing
firm in oligopolistic competition. Additionally, Nevo (2001) proposes exploiting the panel
structure of the data and uses the price of the same label in other markets as instrument,
because the price of product j in two different markets will be correlated due to the common
marginal cost, but market specific valuations are independent across markets. Accordingly,
the instruments I use are the number of products of rival firms, the average price of products
from the same firm in other substitution groups, the sum of characteristics of rival firms,
and squares of own products’ characteristics.
Market Size and the Outside Good
Longstanding elevated levels of cholesterol in the blood induce the formation of plaque in the
arteries causing narrowing or even blockage of arteries. This condition is asymptomatic and
can go undetected for a long period of time generating life-threatening problems like heart
attacks or strokes. Total market size includes consumption of both, consumers in treatment
and potential consumers with high cholesterol levels. In a similar way as Dunn(2012) or
Ching et al. (2012) I use different sources to determine total market size.
The first step is to define the fraction of the population with elevated levels of choles-
terol. Guidelines recommend for a healthy adult to have less than 5 millimoles per liter
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of blood (mmol/L) of total cholesterol and less than 3 mmol/L of low-density lipoprotein
cholesterol. According to the Danish Association of Heart Patients (Madsen and Videbæk,
2004) and the Danish Institute for Rational Pharmacotherapy (IRF, 2006) around 60% of
the Danish population between 40 and 80 years of age exceed these thresholds.This esti-
mate goes in line with a report from the World Health Organization (Roth, 2010) that
shows disease prevalence statistics for similar countries to Denmark, where the percentage
of total population aged 40-79 years with high levels of cholesterol lies between 35% and
61%.
Second, total consumption of statins from consumers in treatment is obtained from
the Danish Health Data and Disease Control Institute (www.medstat.dk). I assume that if
potential consumers were prescribed with statins, they will consume the same dosage as the
average actual consumer. The sum of actual consumption and hypothetical consumption
from potential consumers gives total market size.
Price Elasticities
Finally, the price paid by consumers (pcop) is the relevant price to calculate the associated
elasticities. Using α and σ from the demand estimation the own price elasticity for product
j in a nested logit is:
ηjj =
∂sj
∂pcopj
pcopj
sj
= −α 1
(1− σ)p
cop
j [1− σsj|g − (1− σ)sj].
Cross-price elasticities are expected to be smaller if the products are consider less sub-
stitutable. If product j and product k are in the same substitution group their respective
cross-price elasticity is:
ηjk =
∂sj
∂pcopk
pcopk
sj
= α
1
(1− σ)p
cop
k [σsk|g + (1− σ)sk].
If product j and product l are not in the same substitution group, the cross-price elasticity
is:
ηjl =
∂sj
∂pcopl
pcopl
sj
= αpcopl sl.
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2.5.2 Supply Estimation
On the supply side of the market there are multiproduct firms that are free to choose their
pharmacy purchase price (pf ). Assuming that prices are set in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium,
the profit-maximization conditions can be used to recover markups and marginal cost of
production.
Each firm f , with f = 1, . . . , F , produces some subset ϑf of the J products. The profit
function of firm f can then be written as:
Πf =
∑
j∈ϑf
(pfj − cj)sjM −K (2.6)
Where pfj , cj, and sj are product j’s respective pharmacy purchase price, marginal cost,
and market share. M is total market size including consumption from actual and potential
consumers, and K are the firm’s fixed cost.
The first order condition for product j is:
∂pij
∂pfj
= M
sj + ∑
h∈ϑf
(pfh − ch)
∂sh
∂pfj
 = 0
Each firm sets prices for each product considering the price of all of its other products.
The set of J first order conditions characterize equilibrium prices and can be rewritten in
vector form as S(pcop, x, ξ)−∆(pcop, x, ξ)(P −C) = 0, where S is the vector of shares, ∆ is
a J × J matrix with ∆ = −∂sh/∂pfj if h and j are produced by the same firm and ∆ = 0
otherwise, P is the vector of pharmacy purchase prices (pf ), and C a vector of marginal
cost.
Finally, the J pricing equations can be express as marginal cost and markup, where the
term ∆−1S is a measured of predicted markups:
P = C + ∆−1S (2.7)
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2.5.3 Counterfactual Calculation
Removing parallel importers from the market affects the market participants in different
ways. Firms face less competition which is associated with an increase in prices. Consumers,
additionally to facing higher expenditures due to the increase in prices, are confronted
with less variety. Consumers that consumed parallel imports substitute towards generics,
original products or to the outside option. Finally, the effect of a ban of parallel imports
on governmental expenditures depends on the magnitude of changes in prices and the new
choices of consumers. If, for example, ex-buyers of parallel imports choose original products
and those prices rise, then government expenditures would most likely increase, since prices
for original products are on average higher than prices for parallel imports even before the
prohibition.
To calculate the new equilibrium I use the following three equations. First, I follow the
Danish rules and regulations and use equation (2.1) and (2.2) to obtain the counterfactual
copayment prices as follows:
pcopjcounter = µp
f
jcounter
+ k − 0.8 ∗ prj . (2.8)
Second, eliminating parallel imports does not affect consumers tastes, therefore I use equa-
tion (2.4) to obtain counterfactual shares for each product:
sjcounter(δcounter, σ) =
exp(δjcounter/(1− σ))
Dg
D
(1−σ)
g∑
gD
(1−σ))
g
, (2.9)
where δjcounter = Xjβ − αpcopjcounter + ξj. Finally, removing parallel imports does not affect
marginal cost of production of the remaining firms. Using the same Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium assumptions for the price setting behavior of the firms, I calculate counterfactual
pharmacy purchase prices using the marginal cost implied by the demand estimates as
follows:
P fcounter = C + ∆
−1
counterScounter (2.10)
Solving equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10) simultaneously yields the counterfactual market
equilibrium prices and shares.
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2.5.4 Consumer Surplus and Welfare
Consumer surplus is (Small and Rosen 1981):
CS =
1
α
M ln
1 + G∑
g=1
(
∑
j∈Gg
expδj/(1−σ))(1−σ).
 (2.11)
I use equation (2.11) to calculate yearly consumer surplus with the real data and with
the counterfactual data. The difference CSreal−CScounterfactual measures the effects on con-
sumer surplus generated by prohibiting parallel imports. This measure not only accounts
for possible harm induced by price increases, but, because it takes consumers’ preferences
into consideration, it also captures losses generated by reducing the market variety.
Finally, I define total welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits. The
difference between real total welfare and counterfactual total welfare mirrors the changes
in total welfare from a prohibition in parallel trade.
2.6 Results
This section reports three sets of empirical findings. First, it presents estimates of the
utility parameters and the implied elasticities. Second, it reports cost estimates for the
different firm types. Third, the section provides policy implications from a counterfactual
analysis.
2.6.1 Demand
Estimating the demand side in (2.5) yields the empirical counterparts of the utility param-
eters and the substitution parameters. The following finding reports the empirical insights
concerning the utility parameters.
Empirical Finding 1 (Utility Parameters) The coefficient on copayment price is neg-
ative and the nesting parameter is positive.
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Estimates are provided in Table 2.4. The estimated OLS coefficient on copayment price
α is close to zero (-0.053). When controlling for endogeneity, the estimate is clearly negative,
as expected. This means that a higher copayment price reduces consumers’ mean utility.
Specifically the IV - nested logit estimate of α is -0.832. These estimates are in line with
previous findings: Dunn (2012) finds a price coefficient of -1.61 for anti-cholesterol drugs
based on US data covering the period 1996 to 2007. Similarly, Branstetter et al. (2011)
obtain a price coefficient of -0.30 for the market of hypertension drugs in the United States
between 1997 and 2008.
The OLS estimate of the nesting parameter σ is 0.803, which shows a relatively high
degree of substitution across different product groups. The degree of substitution is lower
when controlling for endogeneity. In this case the estimate of σ is 0.315. Both estimates
lie between zero and one (which is consistent with random-utility maximization) and are
slightly higher than the value 0.24 reported in Dutta (2011).
The estimation of the utility parameters yields further insides. First, products with
less strength (-0.807) and more pills per package (0.018) are associated with higher market
shares. The coefficient on products in groups with patent protection is positive (1.697),
while the coefficient on the number of products in each substitution group is negative
(-0.212), suggesting that a less competitive environment has a positive impact on mar-
ket shares. Second, the firm dummies coefficients indicate that consumers have a strong
preferences for original firms.
Next, I report the empirical insights regarding the substitution patterns.
Empirical Finding 2 (Elasticities) The own-price elasticities are negative and the cross-
price elasticities are positive.
Table 2.5 summarizes the mean own and cross-price elasticities of demand associated
with the coefficient estimated from the IV - nested logit. Part A reports the average
elasticities for all products. The mean own-price elasticity is -3.608 and is very similar to
the obtained result in Dunn (2012) of -3.11. The results on cross-price elasticities are as
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expected small and much lower if products belong to different substitution groups. Part B
of Table 2.5 reports average elasticities for products in each molecule group. Part C of
the table reports elasticities for products in each type of firm. Original firms and parallel
importers, which charge higher prices, have higher elasticities than generics. Finally, Part D
summarizes the results for products off-patent and on-patent. Mean own-price elasticities
are higher if the product is off-patent, which is expected to be more competitive segment.
2.6.2 Supply
This section uses the results from the demand side to estimate the supply side in (2.7).
The estimated average marginal cost of production for a unit of DDD is DKK 5.28 (see
Table 2.6). This cost estimate is below the average pharmacy purchase price of DKK 5.93
(reported in Table 2.2), implying an average unit margin of DKK 0.65. Part B of Table 2.6
also reports average production cost at the molecule level and confirms that all markups
are positive. Interestingly, the table shows that markups differ by the patent status of the
molecules.
Empirical Finding 3 (Competition Effect) Markups are lower for off-patent molecules
and higher for on-patent molecules.
This result nicely mirrors that competition from generics erodes unit markups: the on-
patent molecules generate higher markups than the off-patent molecules because there is
only competition due to parallel imports but not from generics (see Part D of Table 2.6).
Further, the analysis shows that original firms have higher average markups (0.74) than
both parallel importers (0.63) and generic firms (0.58).
2.6.3 The Impact of Parallel Trade
To investigate the impact of parallel trade, I first calculate the counterfactual market
equilibrium when parallel imported products are eliminated from the consumers’ choice set.
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Next, I compare the market outcome when parallel imports are present to the counterfactual
market outcome and derive policy implications.
Counterfactual Market Equilibrium
Solving the system of equations in Section 2.5.3 yields the new market equilibrium prices
and shares, which are used to find the new markups, firm profits, government expenditures
and consumer expenditures. In this section I compare these results with their counterparts
and summarize my findings due to parallel trade as follows.
Empirical Finding 4 (Trade Effect) Eliminating parallel trade reduces average prices
but results in higher prices for both original products and generic products.
Intuitively, average prices decrease because parallel traded products—the cheaper al-
ternative to the original product— are removed from the market. However, as can be
expected, this results in higher average prices for original products. Because prices are
strategic complements, average prices for generic products increase as well. Furthermore,
the copayment prices increases more for original products than for generics, which is caused
by the prevailing reimbursement rules. On another dimension, prices for off-patent prod-
ucts decrease, while prices for on-patent increase. This result provides evidence supporting
the conjecture of Enemark et al. (2006), that firms producing on-patent products do not
engage in competition with parallel importers if there is no generic available, because the
price-sensitive market segment that will switch to parallel imports is small or the parallel
importer faces capacity constraints. These results on price effects due to parallel trade are
reported in Table 2.7.
Next, I analyze the change on market shares that mirrors substitution patterns.
Empirical Finding 5 (Substitution Patterns) Eliminating parallel trade leads to sub-
stitution from parallel imported products towards original products.
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Original firms benefit from a ban of parallel imports while generic firms lose market
share (see Table 2.8). Intuitively, these substitution patterns can be attributed to the
strong preferences that consumers have toward original products. Moreover, off-patent
products gain substantially on shares from a prohibition of parallel imports.
The competitive pressure from generic products is also present when parallel trade is
prohibited. Similar to Empirical Finding 3, I identify the following effect of competition
on markups.
Empirical Finding 6 (Competition Effect) Markups are lower for off-patent molecules
and higher for on-patent molecules even absent parallel trade.
Specially, through the lack of competition of any kind in on-patent markets, original
firms increase their markups substantially more than generic firms. The changes in markups
are reported in Table 2.9.
Further, I analyze the impact of banning parallel trade on profits, government expen-
ditures and consumers expenditures, the results are presented in Table 2.10. Eliminating
parallel trades generates an increase in profits and an increase in expenditures. The av-
erage profit for original firms in a 14-day period is DKK 0.57 million, this profit amounts
to DKK 4.19 million after eliminating parallel imports. On the contrary, the profits gen-
erated by generic firms decrease. Government expenditures and consumers expenditures
follow the same path. Both, government expenditures and consumer expenditures increase
substantially more for original products than for generic products.
Policy Implications
The results from the counterfactual analysis with respect to consumer surplus and welfare
are summarized in Table 2.11. Eliminating parallel importers yield the following result:
Empirical Finding 7 (Welfare) Eliminating parallel trade reduces consumer surplus and
increases firm profits, leading to an overall decrease in welfare.
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Consumer surplus decreases on average by DKK 111.41 million (around $ 18.2 million)
when parallel importers are removed from the sample.9 The decrease in consumer surplus
is driven by two effects. First, consumers face less variety of products and because paral-
lel imports are regarded closer substitutes to original products than generics, consumers
substitute towards original products in the absence of parallel imports. Second, a less
competitive environment is associated with an increase in copayment prices, specially con-
sumers consuming original products face a higher increase in prices. Finally, total welfare
is given by the sum of consumer surplus and profits. The average yearly welfare lost from
a prohibition of parallel importers is on average DKK 54.9 million per year (around $ 8.9
million).
Furthermore, removing parallel imports generates the following results with respect to
government expenditures and consumer expenditures:
Empirical Finding 8 (Expenditures) Eliminating parallel trade increases consumer ex-
penditures as well as government expenditures.
On average, yearly government expenditures increase by DKK 182.7 million (see Ta-
ble 2.12). Consumer expenditures increase yearly on average DKK 75 million and differs
substantially from the results on consumer surplus. This shows that using only consumer
expenditures as a measure of welfare, as is done in previous studies, might underestimate
the total welfare loss.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of parallel trade in the Danish market for statins. It develops
a structural model of demand and supply and uses these estimates to simulate new market
9The observed data covers a period of three years, but only 2004 accounts for the whole 12 months,
therefore each part of the table shows the average for each year. The yearly average at the bottom is
constructed for any period of 12 months.
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outcomes under a hypothetical ban of parallel imports. There are two key results from
prohibiting parallel imports. The first set focuses on price effects, which differ along two
dimensions: the type of firm and the patent protection status of the molecule. Eliminating
parallel trade reduces average prices but results in higher prices for both original products
and generic products. Furthermore, average prices for off-patent products decrease, while
average prices for on-patent products are positively affected by excluding parallel imports.
The second set of results reports the effects on market participants: Firms, government
and consumers. On average, firms profits increase, but the effect is positive for original
firms and negative for generic firms. Consumer surplus decreases due to a decrease in
variety and an increase in expenditures. Moreover, government expenditures increase due
to a prohibition of parallel trade. Finally, total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer
surplus and profits. Eliminating parallel trade leads to an overall decrease in welfare.
My model takes into consideration consumers’ preferences, that determine substitution
patterns, in the measure of consumer surplus, as opposed to previous studies that use only
consumers expenditures as welfare measure. My results support the view that parallel
trade generates significant savings to consumers and insurers. Furthermore, the analysis
carefully follows the rules and regulation in Denmark. To expand these results to other
geographical markets, albeit not difficult, it is necessary to consider these rules, which play
an important role in determining the results.
Finally, while beyond the scope of this paper, the long-term effects of parallel trade, par-
ticularly on incentives to innovate, remain a highly controversial and unresolved question.
Because innovation is an important driver of consumer welfare, the subject constitutes an
important issue for further research.
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Table 2.1: Danish Market for Statins
ATC Code Molecule Brand name Original Firm Obs. Average Number of
Firms Products
C10AA01 Simvastatin Zocor MSD Sharp & Dohme 3,323 11.85 69.51
(1.02) (10.85)
C10AA02 Lovastatin Mevacor MSD Sharp & Dohme 829 5.39 17.44
(0.81) (2.72)
C10AA03 Pravastatin Pravachol Bristol-Myers Squibb 766 5.94 19.28
(2.06) (8.13)
C10AA04 Fluvastatin Lescol Novartis 490 2.00 10.00
(0.00) (0.00)
C10AA05 Atorvastatin Lipitor Pfizer 611 3.03 12.57
(0.44) (1.11)
C10AA07 Rosuvastatin Crestor AstraZeneca 369 1.59 8.10
(0.75) (1.37)
All 6,388 19.71 130.76
(1.96) (7.05)
Notes: Average number of firms and average number of products in each molecule group for a 14-days
period. Products are characterized by the combination of molecule (5-level ATC code), strength, pack-
age size and firm. Standard deviation in parentheses
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Table 2.2: Average Prices
Pharmacy Purchase Price (pf ) Reference Price (pr) Copayment Price (pcop)
A. All Products
5.93 7.31 3.21
(4.53) (5.34) (4.42)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 4.63 4.42 3.76
(4.94) (3.91) (5.77)
C10AA02 7.08 9.16 3.47
(3.78) (4.30) (3.04)
C10AA03 7.71 11.10 2.57
(4.41) (6.20) (1.81)
C10AA04 8.27 12.66 2.56
(2.14) (3.56) (0.72)
C10AA05 7.91 11.53 2.31
(2.99) (4.50) (0.90)
C10AA07 4.92 7.19 1.44
(1.35) (2.05) (0.41)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firm 8.68 10.35 4.63
(3.62) (4.91) (4.84)
Generic Firm 2.62 3.86 1.31
(2.03) (2.32) (1.77)
Parallel Importer 7.64 8.92 4.4
(5.04) (6.07) (5.50)
D. By Patent Status
Off-Patent 5.69 6.67 3.46
(4.78) (5.31) (4.82)
On-Patent 7.00 10.29 2.06
(2.85) (4.34) (0.87)
Notes: Fortnightly average prices for a defined daily dose in Danish krones. All figures deflated using con-
sumer prices index with June 2005 as basis. pf is the pharmacy purchase price, pr is the reference price, and
pcop = pc − 0.8 ∗ pr is the copayment price. The results are summarized as follows: A. All products, B. Prod-
ucts in the same ATC code, C. Products from the same firm type, and D. Products on-patent and off-patent.
Exchange rates in June 2005: DKK 1 = $ 0.1634 = e 0.1343. Standard deviation in parentheses.
36
Table 2.3: Average Sales, Average Revenues, and Average
Expenditures
Sales Revenues Expenditures
Government Consumers
A. All Products
2,446.127 9.139 10.342 3.315
(520.621) (1.891) (2.075) (0.627)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 1,669.324 2.516 2.729 1.344
(550.280) (0.498) (0.579) (0.224)
C10AA02 24.420 0.186 0.188 0.087
(4.845) (0.103) (0.123) (0.037)
C10AA03 182.748 1.554 1.776 0.472
(45.749) (0.803) (0.951) (0.202)
C10AA04 23.021 0.178 0.211 0.053
(4.910) (0.041) (0.049) (0.012)
C10AA05 470.609 4.312 4.982 1.246
(76.914) (0.897) (1.052) (0.263)
C10AA07 79.241 0.409 0.477 0.119
(33.288) (0.166) (0.191) (0.048)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firms 694.424 6.176 6.615 2.325
(167.741) (1.793) (2.018) (0.593)
Generic Firms 1,498.947 1.639 2.182 0.584
(633.574) (0.527) (0.691) (0.176)
Parallel Imports 252.757 1.324 1.545 0.406
(149.244) (0.100) (0.444) (0.141)
D. By Patent Status
Off-Patent 1,890.991 4.367 4.823 1.935
(525.779) (1.165) (1.238) (0.411)
On-Patent 555.136 4.772 5.519 1.380
(72.161) (0.868) (1.020) (0.255)
Notes: Sales are fortnightly averages 1,000 defined daily dosages. Revenues
and expenditures are fortnightly averages in million Danish krones. The re-
sults are summarized as follows: A. All products, B. Products in the same
ATC code, C. Products from the same firm type, and D. Products on-patent
and off-patent. Exchange rates in June 2005: DKK 1 = $ 0.1634 = e 0.1343.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Demand Estimation
OLS - Nested Logit IV - Nested Logit
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Copayment price -0.053*** (0.004) -0.831*** (0.051)
Conditional share 0.880*** (0.007) 0.315* (0.123)
Strength in ddd 0.347*** (0.022) -0.807*** (0.067)
Package size 0.024*** (0.0004) 0.018*** (0.001)
On-Patent 0.979*** (0.064) 1.697*** (0.119)
No. prod. in nest 0.239*** (0.005) -0.212*** (0.051)
Constant -11.416*** (0.609) -10.669*** (0.952)
Firm Dummy Variables
Original Firms
AstraZeneca 0.589 (0.609) 2.813** (0.939)
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2.601*** (0.611) 6.183*** (0.957)
MSD Sharp & Dohme 1.897** (0.609) 9.207*** (1.036)
Novartis 0.415 (0.610) 2.244* (0.940)
Pfizer 2.147*** (0.611) 5.056*** (0.947)
Generic Firms
1A Farma 1.768** (0.611) 2.614* (1.024)
Actavis 0.21 (0.612) 0.742 (0.937)
Alpharma 2.186*** (0.610) 2.084* (0.942)
Alternova 1.401* (0.608) 1.336 (0.934)
Arrow 1.002 (0.632) 4.330*** (0.947)
Durascan 1.987** (0.609) 0.663 (0.952)
Genthon 1.283* (0.617) 1.066 (0.971)
Gevita 1.702** (0.612) 0.634 (0.956)
Hexal 2.052*** (0.609) 2.143* (0.947)
Ranbaxy 1.186 (0.620) 0.915 (0.964)
Ratiopharm 1.198* (0.609) 0.349 (0.959)
Sandoz 1.270* (0.611) -0.073 (0.970)
Parallel Importers
Copyfarm 2.013** (0.622) 0.618 (0.984)
EuroPharma 1.261* (0.616) 1.941 (0.998)
Orifarm 1.454* (0.609) 4.207*** (0.968)
Paranova 1.230* (0.609) 2.237* (0.964)
PharmaCoDane 1.411* (0.608) 4.729*** (1.065)
Recept Pharma 1.230* (0.621) 1.138 (0.957)
Stada 0.082 (0.612) 0.522 (0.979)
Notes: Table 2.4 reports OLS and IV - nested logit estimates of equation (2.5).
The number of observations is 6,388. The specification also includes firm, and
time period dummy variables. The reference category for firm dummy variables
is the parallel importer Universal Pharma. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
sis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent
level. The instruments for the IV - nested logit are: the number of products of
rival firms, average price of products from the same firm in other substitution
groups, the sum of characteristics of rival firms, and squares of own products’
characteristics. 38
Table 2.5: Average Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand
Own-price elasticities Cross-price elasticities
Same nest Different nest
A. All Products
-3.608 0.179 0.0014
(5.263) (0.245) (0.0004)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 -4.398 0.074 0.0015
(6.878) (0.193) (0.0004)
C10AA02 -3.816 0.359 0.0014
(3.380) (0.268) (0.0003)
C10AA03 -2.854 0.191 0.0013
(2.077) (0.137) (0.0003)
C10AA04 -2.559 0.536 0.0014
(0.845) (0.222) (0.0004)
C10AA05 -2.190 0.256 0.0014
(0.732) (0.132) (0.0003)
C10AA07 -1.325 0.272 0.0014
(0.412) (0.188) (0.0003)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firm -5.043 0.273 0.0014
(5.906) (0.259) (0.0004)
Generic Firm -1.542 0.101 0.0014
(2.150) (0.139) (0.0004)
Parallel Importer -5.016 0.230 0.0015
(6.558) (0.317) (0.0004)
D. By Patent Status
Off-patent -3.962 0.162 0.0015
(5.727) (0.245) (0.0004)
On-patent -1.959 0.316 0.0014
(0.806) (0.200) (0.0004)
Notes: Table 2.5 reports mean own and cross-price elasticities of demand using the re-
sults from the IV - nested logit. The results are summarized as follows: A. All products,
B. Products in the same ATC code, C. Products from the same firm type, and D. Prod-
ucts on-patent and off-patent. Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Average Marginal Cost and Aver-
age Markups
Marginal Cost Markups
A. All Products
5.277 0.648
(4.486) (0.137)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 4.038 0.589
(4.906) (0.135)
C10AA02 6.428 0.651
(3.761) (0.074)
C10AA03 7.052 0.655
(4.395) (0.087)
C10AA04 7.537 0.732
(2.184) (0.076)
C10AA05 7.141 0.774
(2.957) (0.110)
C10AA07 4.080 0.840
(1.324) (0.058)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firm 7.940 0.745
(3.673) (0.114)
Generic Firm 2.035 0.584
(2.003) (0.125)
Parallel Importer 7.014 0.631
(4.992) (0.114)
D. By Patent Status
Off-Patent 5.077 0.617
(4.740) (0.125)
On-Patent 6.208 0.789
(2.855) (0.099)
Notes: Table 2.6 reports average marginal cost and
markups calculated from the first order conditions in
equation (2.7) in Danish krones per defined daily dose.
The results are summarized as follows: A. All products,
B. Products in the same ATC code, C. Products from the
same firm type, and D. Products on-patent and off-patent.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Average Change in Shares
Real Counterfactual Change in %
A. All Products
0.124 0.243 96.337
(0.429) (1.539)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 0.161 0.355 120.109
(0.567) (2.103)
C10AA02 0.010 0.168 1621.355
(0.014) (0.637)
C10AA03 0.079 0.086 8.888
(0.176) (0.148)
C10AA04 0.016 0.019 21.171
(0.015) (0.030)
C10AA05 0.254 0.283 11.385
(0.284) (0.268)
C10AA07 0.066 0.063 -3.295
(0.044) (0.059)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firm 0.113 0.481 324.499
(0.214) (2.299)
Generic Firm 0.184 0.058 -68.189
(0.625) (0.137)
Parallel Importer 0.048
(0.165)
C. By Patent Status
Off-Patent 0.116 0.264 127.819
(0.460) (1.708)
On-Patent 0.161 0.156 -3.295
(0.234) (0.215)
Notes: Fortnightly average shares per product in percentage. The results
are summarized as follows: A. All products, B. Products in the same ATC
code, C. Products from the same firm type, and D. Products on-patent and
off-patent. Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Average Change in Markups
Real Counterfactual Change in %
A. All Products
0.648 0.706 9.031
(0.137) (0.215)
B. By ATC Code
C10AA01 0.589 0.645 9.567
(0.135) (0.241)
C10AA02 0.651 0.741 13.875
(0.074) (0.256)
C10AA03 0.655 0.699 6.713
(0.087) (0.119)
C10AA04 0.732 0.733 0.109
(0.076) (0.079)
C10AA05 0.774 0.875 13.148
(0.110) (0.010)
C10AA07 0.840 0.859 2.226
(0.058) (0.004)
C. By Firm Type
Original Firm 0.745 0.852 14.336
(0.114) (0.255)
Generic Firm 0.584 0.593 1.576
(0.125) (0.049)
Parallel Importer 0.631
(0.114)
D. By Patent Status
Off-Patent 0.617 0.674 9.103
(0.125) (0.225)
On-Patent 0.789 0.844 6.968
(0.099) (0.061)
Notes: Table 2.9 reports average markups per defined daily dose in Danish
krones. The results are summarized as follows: A. All products, B. Prod-
ucts in the same ATC code, C. Products from the same firm type, and
D. Products on-patent and off-patent. Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Average Welfare Effects
real counterfactual change change in %
A. Consumer Surplus
May 2003 - Dec. 2003 120.32 56.37 -63.95 -53.15
Jan. 2004 - Dec. 2004 365.55 188.27 -177.28 -48.50
Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2005 28.95 16.85 -12.11 -41.81
Yearly average 232.35 119.78 -111.41 -49.29
B. Variable Profits
May 2003 - Dec. 2003 21.67 36.50 14.83 71.44
Jan. 2004 - Dec. 2004 47.32 171.68 124.37 251.41
Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2005 6.69 11.15 4.47 76.08
Yearly average 38.03 94.54 56.51 167.50
C. Total Welfare
May 2003 - Dec. 2003 141.99 92.87 -49.11 -34.59
Jan. 2004 - Dec. 2004 412.87 359.96 -52.91 -12.82
Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2005 35.64 28.00 -7.64 -21.43
Yearly average 270.38 214.32 -54.90 -20.73
Notes: All figures are in million Danish krones. Exchange rates in June 2005:
DKK 1 = $ 0.1634 = e 0.1343. The average yearly difference in consumer surplus
is -111.41 million Danish krones. The average yearly difference in variable profits
is 56.51 million Danish krones
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Table 2.12: Average Yearly Expenditures
real counterfactual change change in %
A. Government Expenditures
May 2003 - Dec. 2003 207.23 330.43 123.20 62.45
Jan. 2004 - Dec. 2004 251.24 507.05 255.81 101.96
Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2005 48.27 68.10 19.83 41.95
Yearly average 271.51 454.22 182.71 80.90
B. Consumers Expenditures
May 2003 - Dec. 2003 65.92 97.10 31.17 48.28
Jan. 2004 - Dec. 2004 80.76 225.74 144.98 190.85
Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2005 15.76 22.04 6.28 41.14
Yearly average 87.29 162.29 75.00 123.06
Notes: All figures are in million Danish krones. Exchange rates in June 2005:
DKK 1 = $ 0.1634 = e 0.1343.
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A. From pharmacy purchase price to pharmacy retail
price
BEK nr. 133 Mar. 14 2003
Jun. 09 2003
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 60.1% of
the following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 60% of pf + DKK 1.80
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 40% of pf + DKK 7.80
if pf > DKK 60: 20% of pf + DKK 19.80
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.15.
BEK nr. 368 Jun. 09 2003
Mar. 26 2004
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 64.1% of
the following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 60% of pf + DKK 1.80
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 40% of pf + DKK 7.80
if pf > DKK 60: 20% of pf + DKK 19.80
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.15.
BEK nr. 270 Mar. 26 2004
Apr. 12 2004
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 61% of the
following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 60% of pf + DKK 1.80
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 40% of pf + DKK 7.80
if pf > DKK 60: 20% of pf + DKK 19.80
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.15.
BEK nr. 231 Apr. 12 2004
Feb. 28 2005
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 64.3% of
the following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 60% of pf + DKK 1.80
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 40% of pf + DKK 7.80
if pf > DKK 60: 20% of pf + DKK 19.80
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.15.
BEK nr. 123 Feb. 28 2005
Apr. 01 2005
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 59.4% of
the following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 60% of pf + DKK 1.80
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 40% of pf + DKK 7.80
if pf > DKK 60: 20% of pf + DKK 19.80
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.15.
BEK nr. 122 Apr. 01 2005
Jul. 18 2005
From the pharmacy purchase price per package pay 59.4% of
the following amounts:
if pf ≤ DKK 30 : 44.6% of pf + DKK 8.29
if DKK 30 < pf ≤ DKK 60: 31.3% of pf + DKK 12.29
if pf > DKK 60: 18% of pf + DKK 20.29
Prescription’s fee excl. VAT: DKK 6.76.
Notes: Using the information in the table below, the pharmacy retail price including VAT
(25%) and fees for a product in the most expensive category before June 2003 is: pc =
1.25 ∗ (6.15 + 0.601 ∗ (0.2 ∗ pf + 19.8) + pf ). These rules and regulations can be found
under: www.retsinformation.dk
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Chapter 3
Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices:
Evidence from a Reference Price
Reform in Denmark
This chapter is joint work with Ulrich Kaiser, Thomas Rønde, and Hannes Ullrich. It
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3.1 Introduction
A steadily growing life expectancy, aging populations, and the increasing cost of medical
treatments have induced policy makers to introduce various cost containment tools. Ref-
erence pricing, where patients are reimbursed a fraction of the retail price when buying a
prescription drug, constitutes a particularly widely embraced approach (Berndt and Dubois
2012; Esp´ın et al. 2011; Lo´pez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000).
While existing studies have shown that reference pricing effectively curtails prices of
prescription drugs (Aronsson et al. 2001; Brekke et al. 2009, 2011; Kanavos et al. 2008;
Pavcnik 2002; Puig-Junoy 2007), a hitherto empirically unanswered issue is to what extent
differences in the design of reference pricing systems affect market outcomes. A particu-
larly relevant question here is whether reference prices should be determined “externally”,
through a basket of similar products in other countries, or “internally”, through prices of
similar domestic products.
We address that question by estimating the effects of a reference pricing reform in
Denmark, a country that switched from external to internal reference pricing in April 2005.
In Denmark, patients are reimbursed 80% of the reference price. The difference between
the retail price and the reimbursement — the copayment — is paid by the consumers.
Danish patients always co-pay and the reform did not change the 80% reimbursement rate.
Since the Danish reference pricing reform affected all drugs equally — original drugs
(on– and off–patent), generics, and parallel imports1 — we study to what extent these
different types of products were differently affected by the reference pricing reform. We
confine our analysis to statins which currently constitute the best-selling drugs in terms of
sales both in Denmark and worldwide. Statins treat high levels of cholesterol and are used
to decrease mortality and morbidity of patients with cardiovascular diseases.
1Parallel imports are drugs that parallel importers, independent commercial agents, buy in a low-price
country, re-package, re-label, and distribute in a high-price country. Parallel importing is legal in the
European Union.
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We find that the design of reference price systems matters substantially for prices and
demand. In particular, the switch from external to internal reference pricing reduced
both retail prices, reference prices, and consumer copayments by around 22%. There are
substantial differences between the three types of drugs we consider: prices fall most for
generics followed by parallel imports and original drugs, where in the latter case consumer
copayments actually increased. Overall producer revenue and public expenditures both
decrease by around 19% while consumer expenditures decrease by 17% as a consequence
of the reform.
As the first paper to apply a structural demand estimation that is based on a consumer
utility function we are able to calculate a proper measure of consumer welfare changes in-
duced by a modification of pharmaceutical pricing regulation. We estimate an annual total
consumer compensating variation (the amount government would need to pay consumers
for them to accept foregoing the reform) of six million Danish krones (DKK) — around
one million US dollars per year. The relatively small increase in consumer welfare seems at
odds with our finding of a dramatic decrease in total patient copayments. Using changes in
copayments as a welfare measure alone, however, ignores that the reform makes consumers
more price sensitive due to increasing copayments for the more expensive original drugs
which in turn leads them to substitute away from their otherwise preferred original drugs.
Such consumer welfare-decreasing substitution effects go unnoticed if total patient copay-
ments alone are used as a welfare measure as in previous studies (e.g. Brekke et al. 2011;
Granlund 2010).
The paper closest to ours is Brekke et al. (2011) who exploit a quasi-experimental
transition from price cap regulation to endogenous reference pricing that affected a subset
of high volume off-patent drugs in Norway in 2003. They find that the switch from price cap
regulation to reference pricing significantly decreased both prices for original products and
generics and that the change lead to reductions in the market shares of original products.
Brekke et al. (2011) constitutes one of few papers that study both price and demand effects
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of a pharmaceutical pricing reform. Their demand estimation is, however, restrictive in
that it employs linear market share equations relying on the implicit assumption that all
products under consideration are perfect substitutes.
We attempt to generate more flexible and hence more reliable estimates of the causal
effects that the reform of Danish reference price design may have entailed on the demand
for statins. The counterfactual experiment we conduct is to ask what the reform effects
would have been had it occurred in the period before it was actually put in place. The
advantage of this strategy is that we can effectively “filter out” factors other than the
reform that may have simultaneously affected pharmaceutical market outcomes. Specifi-
cally, we first estimate a flexible logit-type demand model (Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995)
that allows for both horizontal and vertical product differentiation as well as for arbitrary
substitution patterns between products by allowing for consumer-specific heterogeneity in
drug demand. Second, we estimate pricing equations to predict the counterfactual prices
of drugs had the reform taken place before it actually did. Finally, we use our estimated
pricing and structural demand parameters to compute counterfactual demand which allows
us to calculate total changes in demand, consumer expenditures, producer revenues as well
as consumer welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 offers an overview of the Danish pharma-
ceutical market and the institutional settings of the reference price reform, Section 4.3
describes our data set, Section 3.4 presents the empirical strategy, Section 4.5 provides our
estimation results, and Section 4.6 concludes.
3.2 The Danish market for pharmaceutical products
As in other European countries, the market for pharmaceutical products in Denmark is
regulated. Denmark follows EU regulations regarding product authorization. Product
pricing, reimbursement rules, and the regulation of pharmacies are national matters.
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The pricing of pharmaceutical products in Denmark is free.2 Changes in pharmacy
purchase prices are notified to and evaluated by the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA).
The agency updates prices every 14 days and makes them publicly available online. Prices
are identical nationwide.
In Denmark, pharmacists must first offer the patient the cheapest product within a
group of substitutes unless the prescription explicitly requires no substitution, which is
the case for just five percent of all prescriptions. The patient may then decide herself
whether or not she buys the cheapest product or a substitute at a higher price and a higher
copayment. Other relevant market features are that (i) Denmark maintains a universal
health care system that is financed through general tax revenues, (ii) that advertising
prescription drugs to patients is prohibited and (iii) that detailing is regulated. Detailing
it is mainly used for new products and not for established drugs, such as the ones in our
analysis.
The reform that this paper investigates involves the change in the way reference prices
are calculated. On April 1, 2005, Denmark changed from external to internal reference
pricing for all prescription-only pharmaceuticals independent of their patent status. The
classification of products into substitution groups remained unchanged. In Denmark, pa-
tients may only substitute among products with the same active substance, administration
form, strength, and similar package size, where package size may not vary by more than
ten percent within substitution groups.
Before the reform reference prices were based on average prices in the EU-15 member
states, excluding Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal. The reference price for a
given product was the lowest cross-state average price among products belonging to the
same substitution group. However, if a product’s retail price was below the EU average,
the reference price was set equal to the retail price. After the reform, the reference price
2There exists one fairly loose restriction, however, by that drugs for which an analogous product exists
cannot be reimbursed if its price is more than 20 per cent higher than the price of the analogous drug.
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was set equal to the lowest domestic retail price out of all products belonging to the same
substitution group.
Around the time of the reform there were other events happening that might have in-
fluenced the behavior of the market participants. We grouped these events and divided our
observed data into six different periods, which are summarized in Appendix A. Our main
relevant dates were set by the Danish government. In May 2004, the Danish parliament rat-
ified the new reimbursement law making it public in June 2004. On April 1, 2005, the law
was implemented. However, it is likely that information regarding changes in reimburse-
ment rules had been at the disposal of market participants prior to these two legislatively
determined dates. On September 17, 2003, the Danish Minister of Health announced the
assembly of a group of experts with the aim of changing the existing reimbursement system
to strengthen competition. Moreover, as a member of the working group, the Danish As-
sociation of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Lægemiddel Industri Foreningen, LIF) launched
the idea of changing the way reference prices are calculated, as was eventually adopted in
April 2005. Between May 2001 and April 2003, LIF maintained a voluntarily agreement on
price ceilings. However, not all members complied with the agreement. After its expiration
in 2003, LIF announced a continuation of the price ceiling for another two years. This was
a unilateral announcement on the side of LIF rather than an official agreement with the
Danish Ministry of Health.3 Finally, the Danish Ministry of Health and LIF again signed
an agreement on a price ceiling in October 2006.
Our analysis focuses on the base period (May 03, 2001 until April 14, 2003) and the
implementation period (April 01, 2005 to September 25, 2006). Our base period is the
3Notwithstanding, we cannot exclude the possibility that the LIF announcement allowed producers
in the market to coordinate on higher prices levels (Knittel and Stango 2003). However, uncertainty
regarding the credibility of the LIF announcement, as well as the volatile market structure following the
patent expiration of a popular product, Zocor, in 2001, suggest that price coordination was difficult to
sustain. For this reason, we interpret the price development as being the result of the announced reform,
but we are not able to separate the effects of the reform from the possible effects of the LIF announcement.
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time between the working group assembly and the ratification in parliament. It serves as
a base because no reliable information about prospective changes in the reimbursement
system was publicly or privately available and because the number of firms as well as prices
remained stable. Our treatment period covers the actual implementation of the reform. We
discard the two LIF agreement periods as well as the adjustment period after the expiration
of the first LIF agreement to avoid including effects other than the actual reform. We also
discard the announcement period because firms were informed about the new legislation
which allowed them to prepare for a new competitive setting.
3.3 Data
Our data set contains fortnightly prices and sales of statins for the period between February
2003 and June 2006. We downloaded the publicly available price data from http://www.medicinpriser.dk.
The sales data are proprietary and were made available to us by LIF. They come with the
same periodicity as the price data.
The site http://www.medicinpriser.dk contains a list of all authorized pharmaceutical
products marketed in Denmark. Prices are updated every second Monday based on changes
reported by producers during the last two weeks. The data base is used by general practi-
tioners when issuing prescriptions, by hospitals for their electronic patient records, and by
pharmacies to ensure nationally uniform prices for prescription drugs.
A pharmaceutical product is characterized by its name, package size, form of adminis-
tration, strength, 5-level anatomical therapeutic chemical classification code (ATC code),
and producer name. The ATC code is a combination of letters and digits that precisely
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describes a product’s active substance.
Appendix B contains a characterization of statins in terms of their ATC code. Statins
are divided into eight different ATC classes, of which six are marketed in Denmark. Three
of them (Simvastatin, Lovastatin, and Pravastatin) lost patent protection before our data
set starts which induced generic entry to the market. Fluvastatin lost patent protection
by the end of 2003 and the remaining two molecules, Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin, are
on-patent during the whole period we analyze. The post-reform reference price for these
two on-patent drugs is then determined by parallel imports.4
Medical practitioners in Denmark tend to regard all statins as close substitutes, at least
with respect to their effects on cholesterol levels and slightly less so with respect to their
resorption. When treating a patient, they follow the recommendations issued by the Institut
for Rational Farmakoterapi (IRF, an institution under the Danish Medicines Agency that
seeks to promote the most rational use of medical products) and simultaneously choose the
active ingredient and dosage. It is not clear a priori if and to what extent Danish medical
doctors and patients are price sensitive. IRF does, however, issue recommendations to
substitute one product by another if (i) it has been demonstrated in clinical studies that
the effects are identical, and (ii) one of the products is substantially cheaper than the other.
Table 3.1 presents a descriptive overview of prices and sales of statins. To make the
different strengths, package sizes, and active ingredients comparable we converted prices
and quantities into Defined Daily Dosages (DDD).5
4Although parallel importing of generics is possible, most parallel imports in our data are original
products.
5We cannot exclude that our DDD normalization suppresses potential non-linearities in pricing. It is
unclear,, however, how that would affect our analysis. In addition, such a problem would only materialize
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Prices are in Danish crowns (DKK) and are deflated using the consumer price index with
the year 2005 as the basis. The average retail price of statins is DKK 7.8 per DDD across
all periods and products. Average reference prices are DKK 6.1 and consumer copayments
are DKK 2.9. These prices differ substantially across the three different types of drugs.
original products are most expensive with an average retail price of DKK 12.2. Generics
are cheapest and cost on average DKK 3.6, while parallel imported drugs cost on average
DKK 11.
All prices decreased from the base to the implementation period on average. This
decrease was stronger for retail prices than for copayments. The decline in retail prices
from the base to the implementation period is smaller for original drugs than for generics
or parallel imports. Copayments even increased for original drugs, on average from DKK 4.6
to DKK 5.8 per DDD.
Sales are on average highest for generics, followed by original products and parallel
imports. From the base to implementation period, sales for generics and parallel imports
increased on average and decreased for original products.
Appendix C summarizes other market and product characteristics such as the number
of products on the market, the number of firms active in the market, average package size,
and average strength. It shows that half of the products are generics and that there are
more producers of generics than original firms or parallel importers. We observe an increase
in the number of generic products from the base to implementation period (from 54.5 to
70.3 on average) and a decrease in the number of original and parallel imported products.
if pricing strategies changed with the reform, an issue for which we do not find any evidence. Moreover,
any time-invariant differences in pricing strategies will be accounted for by our product fixed effects.
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The products we consider are all pills, coated pills or capsules. The median package size
is 98 pills, and the median strength is 20 milligram of active substance per pill. These
characteristics do not vary much between the base and the implementation period.
3.4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy to identify the effects of the reimbursement reform on prices and
demand proceeds in three steps. We first estimate a structural demand model that maps
observed and unobserved product and consumer characteristics to product sales. Second,
we estimate a reduced-form pricing equation that studies to what extent prices changed due
to the reform. This estimation generates the prices that would have been observed had the
reform taken place in the base period already. Third, we use our estimated counterfactual
prices and plug them into our demand model for the base period, the period before the
reform. This generates counterfactual demand for the base period given our predicted
counterfactual prices for the base period. The reform effects are identified by comparing
these counterfactuals with observed base period market outcomes.
3.4.1 Demand Model
Lipid Modifying Agents (LMA), as many other drugs, are both vertically and horizontally
differentiated products. In our model, we account for vertical differentiation by including
product brand names and package size as observable characteristics. An idiosyncratic error
term allows for horizontal differentiation.
To estimate the demand for statins we employ a random coefficients logit model due to
59
Berry et al. (1995). This model assumes that in every time period each individual consumer
i chooses product j that maximizes her utility.6 Omitting the time index t for notational
convenience, her utility function is:
Uij = δj + σpp
cop
j νij + εij, (3.1)
where all consumers obtain mean utility δj, which is common to all consumers and individual-
specific utility σpp
cop
j νi + εij. The term p
cop
j denotes patient copayment. Importantly, we
allow for variation of consumer preferences for price in the population by including the
term σpp
cop
j νi. Own-price and cross-price elasticities may hence vary across individuals
which generates much more plausible price elasticity estimates compared to the computa-
tionally less burdensome simple logit and nested logit models for differentiated products
demand (Berry et al. 1995). To identify consumer preferences regarding price, we assume νij
to be drawn from a standard normal distribution with standard deviation σp, a parameter
that is to be estimated. If σp is insignificantly different from zero, the model collapses into
the simple logit model (Berry 1994). The idiosyncratic random error term εij is assumed
to be i.i.d. Gumbel distributed.
We decompose mean utility into
δj = xjβ − αpcopj + ξj, (3.2)
where xj denotes a vector of observed product characteristics and ξj is an unobservable
6Due to the aggregate nature of our product-level data, we assume that the consumer entity is a joint
physician-patient unit and, consequently, abstract from possible agency problems. The assumption holds
if physicians act in the interest of their individual patients. See Dunn (2012) for a recent example using a
similar assumption in modeling demand for statins.
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product characteristic.7
Vector xj includes sets of dummy variables for product names, strength of the active
ingredient, and package size. These three characteristics implicitly define substitution
groups which are set by the regulator and hence impose a soft restriction on the choice set.
We further include monthly dummy variables to control for seasonal variation as discussed
by Ockene et al. (2004) and Tung et al. (2009) as well as time period dummies.
The assumption that consumers are utility-maximizers combined with the assumption
that εij is i.i.d. Gumbel distributed leads to the following market share equation (Berry
1994):
sj(xi;θ) =
∫
ν
exp(δj + σpp
cop
j νi)
1 +
∑
J exp(δj + σpp
cop
j νi)
dFν(ν), (3.3)
where vector θ contains the coefficient vector β, identical for all individuals, and parameter
σp.
To close the model, we need to define potential market size and implicitly the share of
outside good j = 0. Consumption of the outside good provides consumers with a mean
utility that we normalize to 0 (δ0 = 0). In our setting, the composite outside good consists
of products that are not statins and that may reduce cholesterol level including, for example,
non-statin LMAs, homeopathic products, a bicycle, or a pair of running shoes.
The price of our outside good is not set in response to the prices of the inside goods, the
statins. We define total market size as the amount of DDDs sold if all potential patients
had received statins as medication. We infer the number of potential patients based on a
claim by the Danish Association of Heart Patients (Hjerteforeningen, 2007) that 60% of all
7Note that the mapping between the copayment and consumer utility follows from the combination of
the mean, pcopj α, and individual-specific utility terms, p
cop
j σpνij : p
cop
j (σpνij − α).
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Danish residents between ages of 40 and 80 years have an elevated cholesterol level. At a
total Danish population of 5.5 million this fraction matches well with IRF’s (IRF, 2006)
estimate that 2.1 million Danish residents above the age of 35 have a total cholesterol level
of more than 5 mmol/l, the critical threshold above which treatment with statins is started.
As we base our estimates on DDD, a daily per-patient unit, the potential market size can
be computed simply as 60% of all Danish residents between the ages of 40 and 80. We
employ this broad market definition to provide conservative demand estimates. Decreasing
potential market size, for example, by assuming a lower fraction of people with elevated
cholesterol levels, increases absolute elasticities of substitution.
The term ξj is unobserved by the econometrician but observed by both consumers
and producers. In our setting, we think of this characteristic as quality perception in the
market which might deviate from the time-invariant mean product name effect we explicitly
control for. This quality perception may vary over time and can be influenced by changes
in consumer information through channels such as producer publicity, post-entry clinical
testing, and population product experience. Profit-maximizing producers will adjust prices
to changes in ξj which leads to omitted variable bias in the estimated price coefficient. We
address the resulting endogeneity problem by employing a set of instruments and estimating
the model using GMM. Following Dube´ et al. (2012) we write the objective function as a
constrained optimization problem for numerical robustness:
min
θ,xj
xj
′ZWZ ′xj
subject to s(xj ;θ) = S,
(3.4)
where the vector Z denotes a set of optimal instrumental variables, the vector W denotes
a weighting matrix, and S are the observed market shares. In the construction of the vec-
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tor of optimal instruments, which closely follows Reynaert and Verboven (2012), we rely
on identification arguments in Berry et al. (1995) who include variables containing infor-
mation about the competitive environment. These covariates, termed “BLP instruments”
hereafter, are the sums of other firms’ products’ characteristics (package size and strength
of active ingredient) as well as the number of competitors in the market and in the rele-
vant substitution groups. A detailed description of the identification and estimation of our
model is relegated to Appendix D.
With a fully specified demand model and counterfactual prices at hand we can compute
a simple monetary measure of reform effects on consumer utility, the Hicksian compensating
variation. Formally, we obtain consumer compensation variation measure by solving the
integral over the differences in maximum expected utilities via numerical simulation (see
Small and Rosen, 1981):
CV =
∫
1
α + νi
{
ln
∑
j
exp
(
δprej + σpp
c,pre
j νi
)− ln∑
j
exp
(
δpostj + σpp
c,post
j νi
)}
f (ν | θpre) d(ν)
(3.5)
We will use the parameters of our demand model to predict counterfactual demand (super-
script “post”) for statins based on the counterfactual prices whose estimation we discuss
in the subsequent paragraph.
3.4.2 Reduced-form Price Equation
The idea behind our pricing regression is to infer price changes due to the reform by
regressing actual retail prices on a large set of control variables, fixed effects, and a set of
dummy variables for the reform. This allows us to calculate the prices that would have
been observed had the reform happened in the base period.
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We could in principle also compare prices in the base and the reform period to infer
what products would have cost in the absence of the reform. That would, however, imply to
discard products that were unavailable either in the base or in the reform period. It would
also imply forgoing to control for confounding factors such as the competitive environment
in the counterfactual reform, the base period.
To identify our pricing equation we exploit the panel structure of our data. In particular,
we rely on within-variation for identification by using time-invariant product name fixed
effects. These fixed effects also capture important product-level market characteristics
such as the time a product has been on the market. In addition, we control for seasonal
within-year trends using month fixed effects and for time-invariant cost of active ingredient
strength and package size by including substitution fixed effects as well as pulp and paper
prices. Pulp and paper prices are input prices and affect prices but not the unobserved
quality ξj. In addition, we include the set of BLP instruments discussed in Subsection
3.4.1.
We interact the reform dummy with dummy variables for the type of product, namely
if it is an original product, generic, or parallel imported drug. While Pavcnik (2002),
Granlund (2010), and Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) find strongest price decreases for origi-
nal products, some earlier studies provide evidence for non-decreasing prices for original
products that goes along with increased competition (Frank and Salkever, 1997, Grabowski
and Vernon, 1992, Regan, 2008). This has been labeled the “generic competition paradox”
(Scherer, 1993). The intuition here is that original products may themselves differentiate
even further and only target low-elasticity consumers to avoid facing tougher competition.
While many studies explore the link between reference pricing and competition between
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original products and generics, we are able to identify and differentiate a third group,
parallel imports. The efficacy of parallel importing as a tool to improve price competition
has been a highly debated topic.
We consider retail prices as the relevant price outcome as these are the prices producers
set. They mechanically define copayments and reference prices after the reform. We use
the linear panel specification
ln pjt = γ1Dt + γ2Dt ∗ µb + γ3Dt ∗ µPI + µj + µm + µs + γ4Nt + γ5Nst + zjtγ + εjt, (3.6)
where the dependent variable is the log retail price per DDD of product j at time t. Dt
equals one in the implementation period and zero in the base period. Further indicator
variables are denoted by µ, where subscript b indexes original products (brand), PI parallel
imports, j products, m months, and s substitution groups. The specification also controls
for the number of products in the market, Nt, the number of products in product j’s
substitution group, Nst, the set of BLP instruments, and production cost factors. The
latter variables are stacked in vector zjt. The term εjt denotes an idiosyncratic shock.
From our estimation of Equation (3.6) we calculate counterfactual product prices in the
base period, period BP :
pˆjBP = exp(γˆ1 + γˆ2 ∗ µˆb + γˆ3 ∗ µˆPI + µˆj + µˆm + µˆs + γˆ4NBP + γˆ5NsBP + zjBP γˆ). (3.7)
3.5 Estimation results
Our estimation results fall in three parts. We first discuss our demand model, proceed
with our price estimations, and finally evaluate the reform effects on prices, demand, and
consumer surplus.
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3.5.1 Demand Parameters
Table 3.2 reports the estimated coefficients and the implied price elasticities with respect
to consumer copayment for three alternative specifications of our demand model. The left
columns present OLS logit results where we assume that consumers have homogeneous
preferences with respect to patient copayment (σp = 0) and that prices are exogenous to
demand. The middle columns show IV logit results where we instrument prices. The right
column displays random coefficients logit model results, our main and preferred specifica-
tion.
We estimate a negative and significant copayment coefficient in the OLS Logit model
and a mean own-price elasticity of -.22. We refer to Berry (1994) for a derivation of the
price elasticities for our three models. While low in absolute terms, this simple model
obtains the correct negative sign for the copayment coefficient. Once we instrument prices,
identification of the copayment improves, as measured in terms of t-values, substantially
and the coefficient more than doubles as opposed to the non-instrumented estimates. The
corresponding mean own-price elasticity is -.59. We report our first stage regression results,
our regression of our endogenous variable retail price on the instruments and the exogenous
variables, in Appendix E. The tests for joint instrument significance are all substantially
above the critical value of ten that Stock et al. (2002) suggest.
As we have little reason to believe that all individuals in Denmark are equally sensitive
to price changes, we drop the assumption that σp = 0 in the RC Logit model. This full
model reveals significantly more price elastic demand with a mean estimate of -1.54 and a
corresponding standard deviation of .54. The implied mean elasticities are double the IV
Logit ones.
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Our specification does not include a single dummy for original products. We include
a set of 42 product name dummies instead, the corresponding coefficient estimates are,
however, not displayed for brevity. Averaging over these brand name dummies for original
products, parallel imports, and generics shows that the coefficients related to original prod-
ucts are four times larger than for the other two drugs types, whose coefficients on name
dummies are fairly similar.
Our estimates suggest that consumers are more price elastic than what is found in most
of the existing literature on pharmaceuticals demand (Gemmill et al. 2007, for a survey).
This is not surprising as an external reference price mechanism was in place in Denmark
before the reform. Even with external reference prices, consumers were faced with the
choice between buying either cheaper generics and parallel imported drugs or the more
expensive original products and, hence, they were more price-sensitive than in markets
with little copayment.
In all three models, the coefficient estimates on month indicator variables are in line
with first evidence by Ockene et al. (2004) and Tung et al. (2009), who find that lipid levels
are low in the summer and high in the winter. The corresponding coefficient estimates are
not displayed in the table for brevity.
3.5.2 Prices
Our next step is to calculate the change in prices the reform induced. We run a total of
six alternative pricing regressions. Table 3.3 presents the coefficient estimates in the order
of increasing numbers of control variables. We shall use the full specification, depicted
in column (6), to compute all reform effects in the following subsections. The estimation
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sample contains observations on all products on the market in the base period and the
implementation period. To take into account potential serial correlation we compute stan-
dard errors that are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
product level.
In all specifications, we obtain a negative average effect of the reform on retail prices.
Specification (6) implies that, on average, the reform decreases prices for generics by 35.8%,
original products prices by 7.3%, and parallel import prices by 18.7%.8 Specification (5)
excludes only the original product and parallel import interaction terms. It estimates the
reform effect on retail prices over all types of products at -21.4%.
Specification (1) comes with a minimum of control variables and significantly overesti-
mates the average reform effect with -40.6%. Adding BLP instruments as basic controls
for the competitive environment in specification (2) reduces the bias to some extent. Both
coefficients of the numbers of products in the market and in substitution groups as a further
competition control variable in specification (3) are significant and negative, as expected
based on standard oligopoly theory. Here, the estimated reform effect doubles to -78.8%
which is a sign for substitution group specific effects of the reform on product entry and
exit, i.e. selective entry and exit. Including these continuous control variables, however, we
cannot discriminate between changes and time-invariant levels in the numbers of products
in substitution groups. Therefore, we include further substitution group fixed effects in
specification (4). The latter almost nullify the estimates of γ4 and γ5 in specification (3)
and the bias of the reform effect estimate is further reduced. Finally, in specifications (5)
8We use a log-linear specification with dummy explanatory variable Dt and so the percentage effect of
the reform on retail prices is defined as exp
(
γˆ1 − 12V (γˆ1)− 1
)× 100 (see Kennedy, 1981).
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and (6), we add an input cost index (pulp and paper) and product name fixed effects to
control for time-invariant levels of product quality. The latter should alleviate concerns
that selection may confound our estimates of the reform effect.
Our results can be explained by the mechanisms similar to the ones suggested by Brekke
et al. (2011). The Danish reform strengthened firms incentives to decrease prices by giving
price setters the possibility to influence the market reference price. As the Danish reform
entailed a change within an existing reference price system, the size of its impact on retail
prices and consumer copayments had been an open empirical question. Our results provide
a first attempt to quantify these effects.
3.5.3 Reform Effects on Prices, Demand, and Consumer Surplus
Our demand estimates and our estimates for counterfactual prices form the backbone of
our calculation of counterfactual demand and consumer surplus. The flexibility of our
demand model allows us to take into account consumers’ substitution behavior caused by
our estimated retail price changes from which we infer the induced reference price changes
and patient copayments.
Recall that, after the reform, the reference price is defined by the lowest price in a given
substitution group. A strong price decrease for low-price generics paired with a weaker price
decrease for high-price original products will lead to an increase in consumer copayment for
original products. Hence, we expect the reform to be highly effective in pushing consumers
to substitute away from original products towards generics and parallel imports.
Table 3.4 reports absolute and percentage differences between our observed market out-
comes in the base period and our predicted counterfactual market outcomes had the reform
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already been implemented in the base period. It shows that overall retail prices decrease
by 21.9%, where the largest decrease is accounted for by generics with 46.4%. retail prices
for parallel imports decrease significantly less with 22.1% but, most remarkably, pharmacy
retail prices for original products decrease only by 7.2%. While the latter finding falls short
of the generic competition paradox whereby increased competition causes increasing prices
of original products (Frank and Salkever, 1997; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Regan, 2008),
our results run counter to the findings of Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. (2009, 2011)
who find a stronger decrease in retail prices for original products products. We should keep
in mind, however, that the Danish reform has not been a full switch to reference pricing
but only a change in the design of an existing reference price system.
Copayments decrease significantly both for generics and parallel imports while they
increase for original products. As the final purchase decision is with the consumer fac-
ing copayments, these predicted effects should induce a significant shift in demand away
from original products. This mechanism helps reducing expenditures even if pharmacy
retail prices for original products do not decrease significantly after the reform. Consumers
substitute towards generics that witnessed large price decreases from consistently more
expensive original products. This asymmetric change in copayments is due to the asym-
metric changes in retail prices but comparably uniform changes in reference prices across
drug types. The quite uniform reference price changes are due to the fact that, in the
market for statins, most substitution groups include both original products and generic
products.
Indeed, we find that the demand for generics increases by 30% and for parallel im-
ports by 28.4%. Demand for original products decreases by 26.1%. These results are in
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line with Brekke et al. (2011) and demonstrate the power of a market-based competition-
strengthening mechanism in inducing consumer switching to cheaper products.
Overall government and consumer expenditures decrease by 18.8% and 17%, respec-
tively. Producers obtain 19.5% less revenue. The largest loss in revenues of 29.2% is
incurred by original firms. As the revenues for parallel imports increase by 14.1%, the
reform has had a beneficial impact for parallel importers.
The significant decrease in consumer expenditures can be explained mostly by con-
sumers’ switching from original products to generics and parallel imports. In addition, the
population of potential consumers experienced a utility gain of DKK 6,142,571 ($ 1,013,524)
per year. Given that the reform entailed a substantial total copayment decrease for generic
drugs and parallel imports, this may seem surprising. However, the reform led to copay-
ment increases for original products drugs which forced consumers to substitute away from
original products, for which they have strong preferences as indicated by the large coeffi-
cients on the name dummies for original products, towards generics and parallel imports.
Our finding of relatively small changes in consumer welfare shows that using consumer
expenditures, as in Brekke et al. (2011) or Granlund (2010), as a proxy for patient welfare
may lead to an overestimation of the reform effects. Patient expenditures do, however, not
account for welfare losses due to substitution away from an otherwise preferred product.
We hence find that the Danish pricing reform has been largely successful in decreasing
public expenditures and consumer expenditures. It also incentivized consumers to switch
to generics or parallel imports. While significant utility gains are realized on the national
level, patient welfare gains are low. Producers of original products incur substantial revenue
losses. We approximate the associated loss in total welfare by the sum of the compensating
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variation and changes in producer revenue as DKK 56,473,530 ($ 9,318,132).
3.6 Conclusions
Reference pricing constitutes a widely adopted cost containment tool used by governments
to curb expenditures for pharmaceuticals. While it is well documented that reference
pricing drives down pharmaceutical prices, little is known about the design of such systems.
This paper demonstrated that the design of reference price systems may substantially
impact market outcomes. It analyzed the extent to which a switch from external reference
pricing, where reference prices are determined based on prices of similar products in other
countries, to internal reference pricing, where the price of the cheapest domestic substitute
constitutes the reference price, matters for prices and demand.
We used product-level data to study the effects of a reference pricing reform in Den-
mark in April 2005 when the country substituted external for internal reference pricing.
This reform affected all prescription drugs independent of patent status. The focus of our
analysis were statins which constitute blockbuster drugs both in Denmark and worldwide.
Our analysis showed that retail prices, reference prices, and consumer copayments all
decrease by around 22% due to the switch to internal reference pricing. These changes
are quite unevenly distributed across different types of drugs. Prices decreased most sub-
stantially for generics where consumer copayments declined by as much as 56%. Prices
for parallel imported drugs also decreased significantly while prices for original products
changed comparatively little. Consumer copayments for original products increased by
seven percent — a result which can be explained by a more pronounced decrease in refer-
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ence prices relative to retail prices for this type of drugs.
We used these predicted reform-induced changes in prices to analyze changes in drug
demand caused by the reform. To this end we derived a structural model of the demand for
statins that allowed us to predict counterfactual drug demand and to calculate consumer
welfare effects due to the reform.
Our estimates indicate an overall increase in statins demand associated with the reform.
These demand changes were again unevenly distributed across alternative drug types. De-
mand increased most for generic drugs, by 27%. Parallel imported drugs encountered a
similarly large increase while the demand for original products decreased by 26%. The
switch to internal reference pricing hence induced patients to substitute towards generic
and parallel imported drugs.
Combining price and demand effects we estimated an overall average decrease in pro-
ducer revenue by 19%, a decrease in health care expenditures by 19%, and a decrease in
consumer expenditures by 17%. Parallel importers benefited most from the reform. Their
overall revenues increased by 14% which reflects the relatively small decrease in prices
combined with a relatively large increase in demand. The revenues of generic producers
decrease slightly by nine percent while those of original products decreased by as much as
29%.
We also found that health care expenditures decreased by 20% for generics and by 27%
for original products while they increased by 12% for parallel imported products. These
results indicate that the reduction in reference prices, which constitutes a key determinant
of pharmaceutical cost reimbursement, compensates the associated increase in demand. We
come to an opposite conclusion for parallel imported drugs while the reduction in health
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expenditures for original products follows directly from falling prices and demand.
Consumer expenditures also decreased as a consequence of the reform, by 17% on aver-
age. This reduction is primarily driven by the massive decrease in consumer expenditures
for original products (35%). Consumer expenditures increased, however, by a quarter for
generic drugs and by 22% for parallel imported drugs. In both cases, an increase in de-
mand for the respective type of drugs over-compensates the reform-associated reductions
in reference prices.
Our structural estimation of drug demand allows us to calculate consumers’ compensat-
ing variation, our measure of consumer welfare. It represents the amount patients would
need to be compensated for to maintain their level of utility after foregoing the reform.
Our estimate for the compensating variation is six million DKK (one million USD) per
year. This may seem small given the comparatively large reductions in consumer expendi-
tures, but approximating consumer welfare by patient expenditures ignores welfare losses
induced by substitution from a preferred product (original products) to cheaper alternatives
(generics and parallel imports).
The key result of our analysis is that not only the introduction of reference pricing
as such — as shown by previous empirical studies such as Brekke et al. (2011) — may
have dramatic consequences for market outcomes but that the design of reference pricing
systems may also have substantial impacts on producers, patients, and government health
care expenditures. In particular, our paper shows that a switch from external to internal
reference pricing may effectively stimulate substitution away from original products and
reduce health care expenditures. It may, however, not lead to a substantial increase in
consumer surplus.
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While the present paper confined itself to the analysis of a chronic disease, future
research will extent the analysis to an acute treatment like an infectious disease. We
speculate that the reform effects may be considerably smaller for an acute treatment since
patients may be substantially less price elastic.
Furthermore, adverse regulatory impacts on producers’ static profits may lead to dy-
namic firm reactions, for example a reduction of research and development expenditures.
Innovation is an important driver of consumer welfare in pharmaceutical markets. While
beyond the scope of this paper, investigating the trade-off between static and dynamic
objectives in regulatory policies for research-intensive industries is an important research
agenda.
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Table 3.2: Logit and random coefficient logit demand
OLS Logit IV Logit RC Logit - MPEC
Mean Std. dev.
Copayment -.14*** -.39*** -1.54*** .54***
(.006) (.033) (.271) (.086)
Package Size .02*** .02*** .02***
(.001) (.0006) (.001)
Strength .01*** -.003 -.004
(.001) (.003) (.003)
Constant -9.85*** -6.52*** -6.14***
(.133) (.471) (.594)
R2 .42 .35
# obs. 13,861 13,861 13,861
ηj (mean) -.22 -.59 -1.19
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Product name, month, and
time period dummies are included. F-value in the first-stage regression of
IV Logit: 136.16. 5,000 modified latin hypercube sampling draws used to
simulate market shares in the random coefficients logit model. Elasticities
ηj are market share weighted mean elasticities in the base period.
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A. Summary of events related to changes in the Danish
reimbursement system
LIF Agreement May 03 2001
Apr. 14 2003
Since 2001 LIF members and the Danish Ministry of
Health have an agreement on price ceiling running
until 2005. Not all LIF members comply with the
agreement.
Adjustment Apr. 28 2003
Sep. 01 2003
The Danish Medicine Agency starts updating pharma-
ceutical prices every 14 days. Before, reimbursement
prices were set every 6 months
Base:
Working group
Sep. 15 2003
Jun. 07 2004
The Danish Ministry of Health announces to assemble
a working group that is asked to submit proposals re-
garding reimbursement rules with the aim to increase
competition.
The Association of Danish Pharmacies launches the
idea that reimbursements should be based on the
cheapest domestic product within substitute groups.
The idea earns widespread support among leading
politicians
Announcement Jun. 21 2004
Mar. 28 2005
The law regarding the new reimbursement system is
passed by the Danish parliament
Treatment:
Implementation
Apr. 01 2005
Sep. 25 2006
The new law is implemented
New
LIF agreement
since
Oct. 29 2006
The LIF and the government agree upon on a price
ceiling corresponding to the price on 30 Aug. 2006
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B. characterization of statins in terms of their ATC
code
2-Level 3-Level 4-Level 5 - Level
C10
Lipid
Modifying
Agents
C10A
C10AA
HMG CoA
reductase
inhibitors
(Statins)
C10AA01 simvastatin
C10AA02 lovastatin
C10AA03 pravastatin
C10AA04 fluvastatin
C10AA05 atorvastatin
C10AA06 cerivastatin
C10AA07 rosuvastatin
C10AA08 pitavastatin
C10AB
Fibrates
C10AB01 clofibrate
C10AB02 bezafibrate
C10AB03 aluminium clofibrate
C10AB04 gemfibrozil
C10AB05 fenofibrate
C10AB06 simfibrate
C10AB07 ronifibrate
C10AB08 ciprofibrate
C10AB09 etofibrate
C10AB10 clofibride
C10AC
Bile acid
sequestrants
C10AC01 colestyramine
C10AC02 colestipol
C10AC03 colextran
C10AC04 colesevelam
C10AD
Nicotinic acid
and
derivatives
C10AD01 niceritrol
C10AD02 nicotinic acid
C10AD03 nicofuranose
C10AD04 aluminium nicotinate
C10AD05 nicotinyl alcohol (pyridylcarbinol)
C10AD06 acipimox
C10AD52 nicotinic acid, combinations
C10AX
Other lipid
modifying
agents
C10AX01 dextrothyroxine
C10AX02 probucol
C10AX03 tiadenol
C10AX05 meglutol
C10AX06 omega-3-triglycerides incl. other esters and acids
C10AX07 magnesium pyridoxal 5-phosphate glutamate
C10AX08 policosanol
C10AX09 ezetimibe
C10AX10 alipogene tiparvovec
C10B
C10BA
combinations
C10BA01 lovastatin and nicotinic acid
C10BA02 simvastatin and ezetimibe
C10BX
combinations
C10BX01 simvastatin and acetylsalicylic acid
C10BX02 pravastatin and acetylsalicylic acid
C10BX03 atorvastatin and amlodipine
Notes: Table B displays a detailed classification of lipid modifying agents with their respective ATC codes.
Only boldfaced chemical substances are marketed in Denmark. Source: WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug
Statistics Methodology.
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C. Market and product characteristics
All Original Products
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
All periods
Number of products 122.27 127 14.16 34.42 35 3.79
Number of firms 20.00 19 3.12 4.92 5 0.27
Package size 67.75 98 35.79 67.84 98 34.77
Strength in mg. 28.62 20 18.56 33.92 20 23.67
Obs. 13,861 3,907
Base period
Number of products 126.39 127 4.85 37.23 38 0.97
Number of firms 19.01 19 0.44 5 5 0
Package size 65.97 98 34.96 64.62 98 35.06
Strength in mg. 26.70 20 16.55 34.35 20 22.85
Obs. 2,524 744
Implementation period
Number of products 126.03 132 15.07 33.70 35 2.57
Number of firms 22.17 23 2.30 5 5 0
Package size 67.49 98 34.69 69.87 98 34.47
Strength in mg. 30.70 20 19.97 33.41 20 24.19
Obs. 4,963 1,340
Generics Parallel Imports
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
All periods
Number of products 60.81 60 11.73 32.08 29 9.41
Number of firms 9.95 10 1.71 5.64 5 1.75
Package size 67.61 98 37.16 67.93 84 34.17
Strength in mg. 27.77 20 15.99 24.09 20 14.60
Obs. 6,633 3,321
Base period
Number of products 54.59 55 2.24 35.28 35 5.24
Number of firms 10.01 10 0.44 5 5 0
Package size 66.24 98 35.04 66.98 84 34.72
Strength in mg. 23.85 20 12.20 22.93 20 10.70
Obs. 1,090 690
Implementation period
Number of products 70.34 72 7.24 23.00 26 6.01
Number of firms 10.83 11 1.22 7.07 8 1.48
Package size 66.75 98 35.13 66.17 60 33.43
Strength in mg. 29.79 20 17.68 29.38 20 19.31
Obs. 2,781 842
Notes: Fortnightly average prices for a defined daily dose in Danish krones. All
figures are deflated using consumer prices index with June 2005 as basis, where
DKK 1 = $ 0.1634 = e 0.1343. Quantities measure as sold defined daily doses.
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D. Identification and estimation of the demand model
In the discussion of identification we closely follow recent propositions in Reynaert and
Verboven (2012) about the benefits of using optimal instruments in random coefficient
logit models. Subsequently, we sketch out our estimation procedure.
The unobserved characteristics of product j, ξjt, are known to both producers and
patients, which implies that prices are endogenous in equilibrium and must be instrumented.
Not instrumenting prices leads to downward biased estimates of the price coefficient αi.
We take two steps to remedy the problem of price endogeneity. First, we employ product
name fixed effects to control for time-invariant quality levels. Second, a set of time-varying
instruments accounts for variation around time-invariant means. Hence, identification relies
on the conditional moment restrictions
E [ξjt|Xt] = 0, (3.8)
which is the mean independence of unobserved product quality ξjt of observed product
characteristics X.
These conditional moment restrictions can be transformed into unconditional moment
restrictions
E [ξjtzjt] = 0, (3.9)
where zjt are the instruments. Reynaert and Verboven (2012) have shown that Chamber-
lain’s (1987) optimal instruments work extremely well in random coefficient logit models,
most importantly in identifying the nonlinear parameters. The set of optimal instruments is
defined as the set of derivatives of the unobserved characteristic with respect the estimated
parameters:
zjt = E
[
∂ξjt(θ)
∂θ′
∣∣∣∣Xt,wjt] , (3.10)
where we include an input price index as cost shifter wjt. The intuition is equivalent to
standard instruments with the difference that the derivatives make use of the functional
forms assumed in the model whereas the standard instruments are simple linear projections.
To see this, Reynaert and Verboven (2012) show that the set of derivatives with respect
to the linear parameters β and α are simply the set of observed product characteristics
and cost shifters. The derivative with respect to the nonlinear parameter σ is a nonlinear
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function of all competing products’ characteristics. Hence, the biggest gain is achieved for
the nonlinear parameter σ since the market share equation taking into account consumer
heterogeneity can be exploited. Berry et al. (1999) and Goeree (2008) have previously
approximated the expectation in equation (3.10) to construct optimal instruments. They
evaluate the derivative at the mean of the disturbance vector (that is at ξjt = 0) while
Reynaert and Verboven (2012) form the exact expectation by computing the mean of the
derivative over ξˆjt. The latter is the approach we follow.
Note that in order to compute zjt in equation (3.10), we require initial estimates for θ
the very parameter vector we aim to ultimately estimate. One option would be to estimate
the computationally expensive heterogenous logit model using standard instruments and
using the results obtain therein as initial estimates for the optimal instruments. Reynaert
and Verboven (2012) propose a simpler approach and show that it performs equally well
as running the more general model twice. The idea is to estimate a homogenous IV logit
model first. This is a linear IV regression and, hence, very fast. We choose three sets of
standard instruments for this preliminary estimation. First, the sums of own other prod-
ucts’ observed characteristics and sums of other firms’ product characteristics which follows
the arguments in Bresnahan (1987) and Berry et al. (1995) that the crowdedness in char-
acteristics space should have an impact on equilibrium markups. Second, we include own
product characteristics which are assumed to be exogenous. We follow Dube´ et al. (2012)
by also including squared and interaction terms of the product characteristics active in-
gredient strength and package size. Third, we make use of a cost-side variable to account
mainly for packaging costs. We interact an index for pulp and paper prices with product
name fixed effects. This model does not obtain an estimate for σ so we must guess an
initial value. We set this value equal to the absolute mean price coefficient |α|. With these
initial estimates at hand we can now compute the complete set of optimal instruments zjt
in equation (3.10).9
We estimate the random coefficient logit model using a sample that includes all products
marketed between February 2003 and June 2007. In this sample, we observe 115 bi-weekly
time-periods and approximately 100 products per period. Using our optimal instruments,
9See page 10 in Reynaert and Verboven (2012) for the exact algorithm we use.
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we estimate the model by solving a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) as introduced by Su and Judd (2012) and Dube´ et al. (2012):
min
θ,ξ
g(ξ)′W g(ξ)
subject to s(ξ;θ) = S,
where g(ξ) is the sample analogue to E(zjtξ). The main advantage of this approach as
compared to the nested fixed point algorithm in Berry et al. (1995) is that the first and
second derivatives of this problem are highly sparse in cases with many markets and not
too many products. This can be exploited by numerical solvers and substantially increase
computational speed. It also avoids numerical error propagation by circumventing the
nesting of loops for optimization. We adapt and use Matlab code provided online by Dube´
et al. (2012).
To obtain the constraints s(ξ;θ) = S we solve the market share equation in (3.3)
numerically. We assume ν to follow a standard normal distribution and draw 5000 modified
latin hypercube sampling draws for estimation, as proposed in Hess et al. (2006), which have
shown to be an improvement over frequently used Halton draws.10 We further follow the
proposition in Knittel and Metaxoglu (2012) to use 50 different starting values to increase
confidence that the numerical solver stops at the true solution. The majority out of these
50 estimation runs converge, and those that do, converge to the same solution. The Knitro
8.0 solver’s exit flag confirms convergence (as opposed to pre-mature stopping).
We compute changes in Marshallian consumer surplus. Our assumption of linear utility
implies the absence of income effects so that consumer surplus and compensating variation
coincide. The absence of income effects is a reasonable assumption if the change in consumer
surplus is small relative to household income, which is the case for the Danish reform.
10Consumer demographics such as the income distribution in Denmark are likely to explain some of
this unobserved heterogeneity with respect to price sensitivities. Ideally, we would include the income
distribution when estimating the distribution parameters for the price coefficient. However, given the
shortness of the analyzed time period we do not observe much variation in the national income distribution
in Denmark and, hence, including it will not lead to improved identification of the model. Furthermore,
the fact that Denmark has a comparatively flat income distribution reduces the potential of including this
observed consumer demographic.
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E. First stage results for IV Logit specification
Strength of other firms’ products .0003*** Package size -.017**** Strength -.067***
(.00007) (.002) (.005)
Strength of own products -. 0007*** Package size2 .0001*** Strength2 -.0001*
(.00002) (.00001) (.00006)
Strength × package size .0001***
(.00004)
Dummy variables
Atorvastatin Ranbaxy -99.24 Pravastatin Sandoz -16.30*** Zarator -13.60***
(94.84) (3.493) (2.936)
Canef -13.55*** Pravastatin Stada -44.58*** Zocolip -12.23***
(3.264) (16.06) (3.370)
Crestor -8.48*** Simvacop -31.33*** January .03
(2.776) (9.030) (.111)
Lescol -5.76** Simvastatin 1A Farma 8.57** February .14
(2.835) (3.935) (.122)
Lescol depot -4.77* Simvastatin Actavis -6.09** March -.08
(2.810) (3.040) (.120)
Lipitor -8.91*** Simvastatin Alpharma -2.03 April -.06
(2.942) (2.978) (.123)
Lovacodan -4.21 Simvastatin Alternova -4.78 May -.28**
(3.053) (2.945) (.124)
Lovastatin Actavis -5.13* Simvastatin Arrow -.46 June -.19
(2.839) (3.261) (.124)
Lovastatin Alternova -2.52 Simvastatin Genthon -10.14 July -.04
(2.875) (11.07) (.134)
Lovastatin Universal Farma -9.83*** Simvastatin Gevita -5.59 August -.03
(2.849) (3.936) (.125)
Lovastatin ratiopharm .82 Simvastatin Hexal -9.87*** September -.12
(4.928) (2.917) (.128)
Mevacor -15.58** Simvastatin Merck NM -19.15*** October -.19
(7.595) (7.145) (.121)
Perichol -5.00 Simvastatin Orifarm -24.96** November -.16
(3.422) (10.62) (.117)
Pravachol -38.73*** Simvastatin Paranova -78.24*** LIF Agreement -2.23***
(3.583) (14.20) (.241)
Pravastatin 1A Farma -14.57*** Simvastatin Ratiopharm -25.34*** Adjustment -.78***
(3.533) (4.482) (.211)
Pravastatin Alternova -4.36 Simvastatin Sandoz -12.50*** Working group -.48***
(3.260) (3.025) (.165)
Pravastatin HEXAL -19.09*** Sortis -3.10 Announcement -.76***
(3.529) (3.884) (.152)
Pravastatin Nycomed -9.62*** Statinacop -2.98 Implementation -.13
(2.858) (4.002) (.133)
Pravastatin Ranbaxy -15.39*** Tahor -7.00**
P&P × Name Yes(3.875) (3.384)
Pravastatin Recept -9.35** Torvast -12.49*** Constant 12.44***
(4.083) (3.822) (3.156)
F-test results
All instruments 136.16
BLP instruments 30.91
Pulp & Paper (P&P) instruments 16.35
Squares and interactions instruments 13.70
R2 .59
Notes: First stage regression coefficients of IV Logit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference cate-
gories for dummy variables are: Product name Zocor, Month December, and Period ‘New LIF agreement’.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
91
92
Chapter 4
How Do Drug Prices Respond to a
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4.1 Introduction
Reference pricing systems, where patients are reimbursed a fraction of the retail price when
buying a prescription drug, constitute a particularly widely embraced tool to curb medical
expenses across the world (Berndt and Dubois 2012; Esp´ın et al. 2011; Lo´pez-Casasnovas
and Puig-Junoy 2000). These systems aim at benefiting patients that prefer cheaper prod-
ucts over more expensive ones, thus inducing more price sensitivity on consumers and more
competitive pressure on firms.
There exists a large body of empirical evidence that shows that such systems indeed are
effective in bringing down retail prices of prescription drugs (Aronsson et al. 2001; Brekke
et al. 2007, 2009, 2011; Danzon and Liu 1998; Kanavos et al. 2008; Pavcnik 2002; Puig-
Junoy 2007). It is also observed that different countries apply different rules as to how
the reference price is determined. However, much less is known about the consequences of
the design of such reference price systems. In April 2005, Denmark switched from external
reference pricing (where the reference price was calculated as the average price of similar
products in other European countries) to internal reference pricing (where the reference
price is calculated as the cheapest price of a similar product in the country). A switch from
an external to an internal reference price system creates incentives for patients to buy the
cheapest product within a set of substitutes, since the price wedge between the cheapest
substitute and a preferred products becomes larger due to the reform, unless there is only
a single product in a group of substitutes. This argument is theoretically formalized by
Brekke et al. (2009, 2011). We empirically study the effects on prices of a change in the
design of the reference price system using a comprehensive panel set that covers around
23,600 observations of 640 unique products that we track for 59 fortnightly time periods.
We speculate that the effect of the reform on prices varies by the severity of the condition
and by the type of the firm. Specifically, we distinguish between drugs that treat a chronic
disease, a semi-chronic disease, and an acute disease. For the chronic condition we use
anti-cholesterol drugs (statins). For the semi-chronic condition we use drugs for peptic
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ulcer and gastro-oesophageal reflux disease (antiulcerants). And for the acute condition
we use antibiotics. Our prior is that patients with a chronic condition are more price
sensitive than patients with an acute condition because health expenditures are generally
substantially higher, treatment time is longer and patients might be more experienced and
better informed about their substitution options.
In addition, we differentiate between three types of firms: original firms, generic firms
and parallel importers. Original firms engage in R&D using intellectual property rights
to protect their innovations. Generic firms produce drugs that are bioequivalent copies
of original products and may only legally enter the market after the patents have expired.
Parallel importers do not engage in manufacturing. Instead, they buy products in low-price
countries, repackage, relabel, and sell them in high-price countries. Parallel importing is
legal within the European Union and in Denmark it is permitted for both on-patent and off-
patent pharmaceuticals. We explicitly allow the reform to affect each type of firm differently
to account for the evidence supported by a large body of literature suggesting that generics
are perceived to be different from original products. Previous studies find that original firms
keep high prices and are able to retain substantial market shares despite the presence of
low-price generic substitutes. This is associated with consumer heterogeneity with respect
to their price sensitivity and consumers brand-loyalty generated by first-mover advantage
(Caves et al. 1991; Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997; Aronsson et
al. 2001; Coscelli 2000). Specifically, after generics enter the market, the price sensitive
consumers switch and original producers are left with consumers that are even less price
sensitive and probably brand-loyal. We expect that the switch from external to internal
reference pricing affects generics more than original products, because these are consumed
by more price sensitive patients. In addition, parallel imports are closer substitutes to
original firms because they are not copies but exactly the same product in another package.
Therefore, we expect parallel importers to react similarly to original firms.
Our paper is most closely related to the seminal work of Pavcnik (2002). She studies
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a switch from price cap to external reference pricing in Germany, one of the countries
that first introduced this policy. She uses reduced-form pricing regressions where she maps
dummy variables for the time period after the regulatory change to retail prices. Our
findings suggest that producers substantially reduced prices after the reform. In particular,
she finds that the effects are stronger for original products, specially for those that faced
generic competition. We also explore the latter finding and control for competition. We
expect the reform to reinforce the effects of competition, such that prices decrease more in
markets facing more competitors after the reform is introduced.
Other related work includes Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) and Kaiser et al. (2013). The first
two papers study a switch from price cap to reference price regulation in Norway, confirming
the previous results. In Kaiser et al. (2013) we conduct a welfare analysis of the Danish
change from external to internal reference pricing. This analysis focuses on anti-cholesterol
products only and it also includes reduced–form pricing equations similar to Pavcnik. The
main finding is that the substitution from external to internal reference pricing yield a
substantial decrease in prices, but opposite to Pavcnik, the effects are stronger for generics.
The present analysis extends our earlier analysis by including treatments for a semi-chronic
and an acute condition.
In our paper we find that the switch from external to internal reference pricing has
effectively impacted pharmacy purchase prices negatively, more so for chronic conditions
than for acute conditions. We also show that the reform affected prices for generics and
parallel imports more than for original products. Finally, competition plays an important
role and we show that the change in the design of reference pricing reinforced the effects
of competition in reducing prices, inducing strongest price changes for markets with many
substitute products.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 offers an overview of the Danish phar-
maceutical market. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 describes the empirical
framework. Section 4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Institutional Background
This section offers a short overview of the Danish pharmaceutical industry and describes
the main regulatory framework. In Denmark the pricing of pharmaceutical products is free
in the sense that firms can set any price. However these prices must be reported to the
Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA) every 14 days. DKMA makes them publicly available
online under URL http://medicinpriser.dk, a website that also contains information on all
authorized pharmaceutical products in Denmark and was designed to ensure that prices
for pharmaceuticals are identical nationwide.
Second, pharmacies operate in a highly regulated environment. The number and lo-
cation of pharmacies, as well as their markups are regulated by the government. The
regulation of the markup implicitly sets the pharmacy retail price pc, such that pc = pf +k,
where pf is the price set by the firm (pharmacy purchase price) and k is the prescription
fee (including value added taxes, (VAT)). Moreover, Danish pharmacists are required to
dispense the cheapest product among available substitutes, unless the consumer or the
doctor explicitly requests another product.
Third, consumers are entitled to free and equal access to health care services. The
reimbursement that consumers obtain when buying pharmaceuticals depends on her annual
health care expenditures and the choice of the product. The final price paid by consumers
pcop is given by:
pcop = pc − τ ∗ pr, (4.1)
where pc denotes the pharmacy retail price, pr is the reference price and τ is the fraction of
the reference price that will be reimbursed. Consumers in long term treatments with high
prices can obtain as much as 80 percent of their cost reimbursed.
The reform affecting reference prices took effect on April 1, 2005. Denmark changed
from external to internal reference pricing for all prescription-only pharmaceuticals inde-
pendent of their patent status. No other changes were made to the reimbursement system.
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Before the reform, the reference price for a given product was defined as the pharmacy
retail price of the chosen product up to the average price of the same product in the EU-15
member states, excluding Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal. Once the retail price
exceeded the EU average price, the reference price was set equal to the EU average price.
The reimbursement reform originated from an assembly of a group of experts from
the Danish Ministry of Health on September 15, 2003, who wanted to collect ideas for a
reform of the existing reimbursement system to strengthen competition and cost awareness.
The Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Lægemiddel Industri Foreningen,
LIF) — the Danish assembly of original drugs producers — launched the idea of using the
domestic Danish price of the cheapest available product within a substitution group as the
reference price instead of EU averages. In June 2004, the Danish parliament ratified the
new reimbursement law making it public and implementing it in April 1, 2005.
These government–determined dates are important for our analysis as they define the
time periods before and after the reform. Other events that may have affected drug prices
include a voluntarily agreement on price ceilings that was established by LIF members
between May 2001 and April 2003 and a new agreement on price ceilings that the Danish
Ministry of Health and LIF ratified in October 2006. The voluntary price ceilings agreement
was not respected by most LIF members, and probably neither by generic firms or parallel
importers, since they are not represented by LIF.
In order to separate the reform effects from the price ceiling agreements before and after
the reform, we define and focus our analysis to a base period and an implementation period.
The base period includes the time between September 15, 2003 and June 7, 2004 — the
time between the working group assembly and the ratification of the reform in parliament.
We choose these dates because, during that time, no reliable information about prospective
changes in the reimbursement system was publicly or privately available. Moreover, the
number of firms as well as prices remained stable, an issue that we discuss in more detail
in Section 4.3. The implementation period covers the time between April 1, 2005 and
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September 25, 2006, the time span between the reform implementation and the beginning
of the new price ceiling agreement. We discard all other time periods for our empirical
analysis.
4.3 Data
Our data set contains fortnightly prices and other characteristics of pharmaceuticals in
three therapeutic markets: Anti-cholesterol drugs, drugs for acid-related gastrointestinal
conditions, and antibiotics. These products are used in the treatment of diseases that
vary in their severity and length of therapy with anti-cholesterol drugs constituting the
longest and with more severe consequences and antibiotics constituting the shortest and
least severe therapy.
We differentiate these markets because we expect the reform to have different effects
in each one. Our prior is that patients with a chronic condition are more price sensitive
than patients in an acute treatment, due to the fact that their health care expenditures are
generally substantially higher, treatment time is longer and they might be more experienced
and better informed about their substitution options.
A product is defined by four attributes: active substance, strength, package size, and
firm. The active substance is captured by the 5-level anatomical therapeutic chemical
classification code (ATC Code). Strength measures the amount of the active substance in
milligram per pill. Package size is the number of pills per package. Importantly, products
with similar ATC codes are closer substitutes than products in other ATC codes. DKMA
classifies products with the same 5-level ATC code, strength, administration form, and
similar package size into substitution groups. Products within a substitution group are
perfect substitutes and consumers can freely choose among products in the same substitu-
tion group.
To make products from different strength or package size comparable we normalize
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prices and quantities using defined daily doses (DDD). This measure is proposed by the
World Health Organization and widely used in the pharmaceutical industry. One DDD is
defined as the average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main indication in
adults.
Our dependent variable is the pharmacy purchase price in Danish krones (DKK) per
defined daily dose (DDD), i.e. the price that is actually set by the producers for a unit of
DDD. Prices are deflated using the consumer price index with the year 2005 as basis.
Table 4.1 provides information on turnover, reimbursement, the number of patients
in treatment and sales for each therapeutic group. This information is not based on
the product-level data that we use in our econometric analysis but was downloaded from
www.medstat.dk, a website that contains yearly statistics on consumption and utilization
of pharmaceuticals in Denmark. The table shows that turnover (pharmacy retail price ×
DDDs sold) is relatively similar to all products but slightly higher for antiulcerants. How-
ever, the chronic conditions account for a higher share of reimbursement than the acute
condition. Moreover, the number of patients differs enormously between the treatments. In
2005 almost 1.7 million patients were treated with antibiotics. In the same year the number
of patient treated with antiulcerants was around 380,000 and 307,000 patients were treated
with anti-cholesterol drugs. The increase in the number of patient using anti-cholesterol
drugs is remarkable (170 percent from 2002 to 2006). Utilization per patient (sales in DDD
relative to number of patients) is much higher for anti-ulcerant and anti-cholesterol drugs
than for antibiotics.
Finally, Table 4.1 also gives an estimate of the duration of treatment indicated by the
measure at the bottom of the table. If we convert it into sales in DDD per inhabitant per
year, the measure constitutes an estimate of the number of days for which each resident is
annually treated on average. If each person in Denmark was treated with anti-cholesterol
drugs, the treatment length in 2006 would be around 22 days. The treatment for antiulcer-
ants would be between 11 and 14 days, and the treatment with antibiotics would only take
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five days. These figures are approximations and are just meant to illustrate differences in
treatment durations. Actual treatment with anti-cholesterol drugs can be lifelong, while a
treatment with antiulcerants lasts between six weeks and six months.
Our data is consists of information on 253 antiulcerants, 228 statins, and 157 antibiotics
that we observe for 58 fortnightly time periods.1 Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics
on prices and variables that mirror the respective competitive situation. Reported are
fortnightly average prices for a DDD in DKK. A DDD of antibiotics costs on average more
than a DDD of anti-cholesterol products or antiulcerants. Note that average reference
prices are higher than average pharmacy purchase prices, because the latter do not include
prescription fees or VAT.
Furthermore, the average number of products and average number of firms is relatively
stable and very similar for all groups, which helps us mitigate attributing effects to the
reform that could have arisen from entry and exit. In contrast, the average number of
substitution groups and the average number of products in a substitution group differs
significantly. For anti-cholesterol drugs there are on average 40 substitution groups, each
with around five to seven products to choose from. In the case of anti-ulcerants there are
only around three products in each substitution group, and in the antibiotics group, there
are only two products in each substitution group. We expect the reform to have stronger
effects on the chronic condition, since this is the therapy that faces more competition.
Finally, the table presents the share of original products, generic products, and parallel
imports in each group. The share of generics in the chronic and semi-chronic condition is
higher than the share of original products. Parallel imports are also well represented in
these groups (28 percent of anti-cholesterol drugs and 12 percent of antiulcerants) but not in
the group of antibiotics, where they only make one percent of all observations. Antibiotics
is a group dominated by original products.
1Appendix A displays the exact classification of the products in terms of their ATC code.
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4.4 Empirical Approach
This section describes our empirical framework. Our aim is to identify the effect of the
reimbursement reform on pharmacy purchase prices. To this end, and like Pavcnik (2002),
we estimate standard fixed effects regressions of dummy variables for the reform and vari-
ables that represent competition on the natural logarithm of pharmacy purchase prices.
Our regression equation take the following form:
ln pfjt = ρR+α1R∗dop+α2R∗dpi+γ1zj+γ2R∗zj+β1R∗zj ∗dop+β2R∗zj ∗dpi+µj+νt+jt,
where pfjt is the pharmacy purchase price of a product j in time t. R denotes a dummy
variable that is coded one for the implementation and zero for the base period. It is our
variable of main interest and its corresponding parameter ρ is to be interpreted as the
approximate percentage difference between the pharmacy purchase price before and after
the reform. dop and dpi are dummy variables equal to one if the product is an original
product (op) or if the product is a parallel import (pi) respectively. We interact these
dummy variables with the reform dummy to allow for different impacts in different types
of firms. The variable zj is the number of products in a substitution group and measures
the the current competitive situation of product j. We interact zj with the reform dummy
to allow competition to have different effects on prices before and after the reform and in
addition, we permit these effects to differ for each firm type by interacting them with the
firm type dummy variables. The term µj lumps together all product-specific time-invariant
characteristics of product j. Since all drug characteristics — strength, active ingredient,
package size and substitution group — are time-invariant, we do not need to additionally
account for them. Finally, we include a full set of time dummy variable νt and the term jt
is an iid Normal distributed error term.
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4.5 Results
This section reports our empirical findings from a change in the design of reference pricing.
The results are summarized separately for each therapeutic treatment. Table 4.3 presents
the results for anti-cholesterol drugs, Table 4.4 the results for antiulcerants, and Table 4.5
the results for antibiotics.
Empirical Finding 9 (Price Effect) A switch from external to internal reference pric-
ing yields a substantial reduction in pharmacy purchase prices. The effects are stronger for
chronic conditions than for acute conditions.
Importantly, the effects of the reform are stronger the more severe the condition is. We
find that prices decrease by 47 percent (= exp(−0.633) − 1) for statins, by 22.9 percent
for anti-ulcerants and 5.3 percent for antibiotics. These are the results from a specification
that includes only a dummy variable for the reform and product-specific fixed effects (see
Specification (1) in all tables). This pattern is robust to the inclusion of more explanatory
variables. These results support the view that consumers with a chronic condition are
more price sensitive than those with an acute condition and as expected, the reaction to
the reform in chronic groups is stronger.
We additionally study differences in reform effects for each type of firm. In Specification
(2) we introduce two variables that measure the effect of the reform on original products
and the effect of the reform on parallel imports. Generics constitute the base category and
the coefficient on the reform dummy corresponds to the reform effect on generics.
Empirical Finding 10 (Effects by Type of Firm) A switch from external to internal
reference pricing affects generic firms and parallel importers stronger than original firms.
The effects on generics and parallel imports is stronger than for original products in all
therapeutic groups. Specially in the group of statins, where the negative effect on original
products (-0.23 = exp(−0.907+0.648)−1) is substantially lower than the effects on generics
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(-59.6 percent) or parallel imports (-60 percent). Furthermore, in all therapeutic groups, the
differences in effects between generics and parallel imports are small and not statistically
significant. Contrary to our findings, Pavcnik (2002), Granlund (2010), and Brekke et
al. (2011) find stronger price decreases for original products. However, these studies analyze
the introduction of reference pricing, while in our setting, a policy of reference pricing was
already in place and we expect patients to be already more price sensitive.
Next, we use the number of products in a substitution group as a measure for compet-
itiveness and allow it to affect prices differently before and after the reform.
Empirical Finding 11 (Effects of competition) A switch from external to internal ref-
erence pricing reinforces the effects of competition. Specially for generic products and
chronic conditions.
The results correspond to Specification (3) and indicate that it is ambiguous how more
products in a substitution group affect prices. The effects for statins is almost zero, for
antiulcerants is negative, while the effect for antibiotics is positive. However, we show
that the reform reinforces the expected effect of competition and this result is consistent
in all three markets. The coefficient of Reform × # of products in substitution group is
negative and significant for all therapeutic groups, suggesting that more competition after
the reform is associated with lower prices. This result also holds if we further allow the
reform effects to be different for products from different types of firms (Specification (4)).
These findings reflect the differences in the structure of the therapeutical markets. Products
in the same substitution group are closer substitutes to each other, than products outside
the substitution group. While for antibiotics there are many substitution groups each with
few products, the structure for statins is the opposite: few substitution groups each with
more products (as reported in Table 4.2). The reform reinforces the effects of competition
more for chronic conditions, where there are many substitution options, than for acute
conditions, where there are fewer substitution options. Furthermore, in Specification (5)
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we allow competition to have a different effect, not only before and after the reform, but
also for different types of firms. The results suggest that the reform reinforces competition
effects particularly for generic products.2
To summarize our results, we find that the switch from external to internal reference
pricing has effectively impacted pharmacy purchase prices negatively, mostly so for chronic
conditions than for acute conditions. We also show that the reform affected prices for
generics and parallel imports more than for original products. Finally, competition plays
an important role and we show that the change in the design of reference pricing reinforced
competitive pressure, inducing strongest price changes for markets with many substitute
products.
4.6 Conclusion
While it is undisputed that reference pricing effectively brings down prices of pharmaceuti-
cal products, much less is known how a reference price system should ideally be designed.
We focus our analysis on one particularly question: should reference prices be externally
determined or internally determined? To provide an answer, we use a Danish reform for
reimbursement of expenditures for pharmaceuticals.
As Pavcnik (2002) we estimated reduced-form pricing equations where we linked the
reform to pharmaceutical purchase prices for three types of therapeutic groups that differ
in the severity of the condition: anti-cholesterol drugs, that treat a chronic condition,
antiulcerants, that treat a semi-chronic condition, and antibiotics for the treatment of an
acute condition. We allow for different effects in these groups because consumers differ in
their price sensitivity by the type of condition. Consumers with a more prevalent disease
face regular and higher expenditures, thus we expect them to be better informed with
regard to their substitution alternatives, than consumers that are treated occasionally and
2Appendix B presents the results from specification (5) separately for each type of firm, in each thera-
peutic group.
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for a short period of time, as is usually the case of antibiotics.
We find that the switch from external to internal reference prices substantially reduced
pharmacy purchase prices. The effects are stronger for chronic conditions and for generics
products and parallel imports. Furthermore, the reform reinforces the effects of competi-
tion.
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Table 4.1: Market Overview
Variable Type of treatment 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Turnover in
DKK 1,000
Anti-cholesterol 489,240 457,672 334,291 280,264 301,282
Antiulcerants 613,756 613,876 618,724 622,886 596,833
Antibiotics 338,624 331,975 338,262 352,013 376,395
Reimbursement
in DKK 1,000
Anti-cholesterol 362,503 326,350 224,843 189,755 208,073
Antiulcerants 389,119 376,426 368,650 381,571 362,280
Antibiotics 137,805 138,012 142,850 149,669 169,837
Number of
patients in
treatment
Anti-cholesterol 138,464 189,821 250,111 307,080 374,839
Antiulcerants 327,317 341,323 358,808 379,164 407,389
Antibiotics 1,621,397 1,625,345 1,636,340 1,666,884 1,684,154
Sales in
DDD/1,000
inhabitants/day
Anti-cholesterol 15.6 23.9 34.9 46.7 60.8
Antiulcerants 31.8 33.1 35.1 37.6 40.8
Antibiotics 13.4 13.7 14.2 14.9 15.3
Source: www.medstat.dk
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Type of treatment Variable
Base period Implementation period
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Anti-cholesterol
Pharmacy purchase price pf 6.20 4.48 3.88 4.27
Reference price pr 7.37 5.50 4.31 5.29
Number of products 127.19 4.11 127.06 14.53
Number of firms 19.01 0.45 22.27 2.31
Number of substitution groups 39.92 0.62 39.04 0.92
Products in substitution group 6.95 4.55 5.01 2.55
Original product (=1 if original) 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44
Generic product (=1 if generic) 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.50
Parallel import (=1 if parallel import) 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.38
Total Observations 2,541 4,759
Antiulcerants
Pharmacy purchase price pf 7.61 11.02 7.86 11.68
Reference price pr 12.1 19.41 11.91 20
Number of products 143.16 2.99 152.98 14.77
Number of firms 22.66 0.47 21.44 0.91
Number of substitution groups 69 0.77 63.26 1.07
Products in substitution group 3.57 2.55 3.61 1.90
Original product (=1 if original) 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.40
Generic product (=1 if generic) 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49
Parallel import (=1 if parallel import) 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41
Total Observations 2,862 5,909
Antibiotics
Pharmacy purchase price pf 18.78 74.22 19.04 76.03
Reference price pr 30.03 106.35 29.53 105.42
Number of products 141.05 2.68 117.71 3.44
Number of firms 14.97 1.11 13.07 0.35
Number of substitution groups 96.53 1.97 86.70 1.56
Products in substitution group 2.07 1.31 1.81 1.09
Original product (=1 if original) 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49
Generic product (=1 if generic) 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48
Parallel import (=1 if parallel import) 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13
Total Observations 2,820 4,587
Notes: Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for all variables in each therapeutic group. Prices are fortnightly
averages for a defined daily dose in Danish krones. All figures deflated using consumer prices index with June
2005 as basis.DDD
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results – Anti-Cholesterol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform -0.633*** -0.907*** -0.316*** -0.848*** -0.828***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065)
Reform × Original 0.648*** 0.624*** 0.557***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.052)
Reform × PI -0.013 -0.008 0.111
(0.035) (0.036) (0.080)
# Products in subs. group 0.001 -0.031*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Reform × # Products in subs. group -0.079*** -0.038*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × Original 0.016*
(0.009)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × PI -0.024*
(0.013)
N=7,300
R2 0.202 0.285 0.246 0.300 0.301
Notes: Table 4.3 reports linear regression estimates of the coefficients in our pricing equation for the thera-
peutic market of anti-cholesterol products. The variable PI stands for parallel import, the variable Original
stands for original product. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimation sample contains only the
base and the implementation period. Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Estimation Results – Antiulcerants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform -0.260*** -0.253*** -0.237*** -0.251*** -0.160***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Reform × Original -0.008 0.036*** -0.174***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.022)
Reform × PI -0.030* 0.034* -0.263***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.042)
# Products in subs. group -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.046***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Reform × # Products in subs. group -0.006*** -0.007** -0.046***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × Original 0.079***
(0.006)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × PI 0.079***
(0.009)
N=8,771
R2 0.102 0.102 0.120 0.121 0.138
Notes: Table 4.4 reports linear regression estimates of the coefficients in our pricing equation for the thera-
peutic market for antiulcerants. PI stands for parallel import, Original stands for original products. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The estimation sample contains only the base and the implementation pe-
riod. Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results – Antibiotics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform -0.055*** -0.071*** -0.006 -0.010 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Reform × Original 0.025*** 0.006 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Reform × PI -0.019 0.024* 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.080)
# Products in subs. group 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Reform × # Products in subs. group -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × Original 0.008**
(0.003)
Reform × # Products in subs. group × PI 0.006
(0.021)
N=7,407
R2 0.065 0.072 0.108 0.108 0.109
Notes: Table 4.5 reports linear regression estimates of the coefficients in our pricing equation for the ther-
apeutic market for antibiotics. PI stands for parallel import, Original stands for original products. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The estimation sample contains only the base and the implementation pe-
riod. Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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A. Characterization of Products in Terms of Their ATC
Code
Type of treatment ATC 4-Level ATC 5-Level Molecule name
Anti-
cholesterol
C10AA
HMG CoA reductase inhibitors
(Statins)
C10AA01 Simvastatin
C10AA02 Lovastatin
C10AA03 Pravastatin
C10AA04 Fluvastatin
C10AA05 Atorvastatin
C10AA07 Rosuvastatin
Antiulcerants
A02BA
H2-receptor antagonists
A02BA01 Cimetidine
A02BA02 Ranitidine
A02BA03 Famotidine
A02BA04 Nizatidine
A02BC
Proton pump inhibitors
A02BC01 Omeprazole
A02BC02 Pantoprazole
A02BC03 Lansoprazole
A02BC04 Rabeprazole
A02BC05 Esomeprazole
Antibiotics
J01CA
Penicillins with extended
spectrum
J01CA01 Ampicillin
J01CA02 Pivampicillin
J01CA04 Amoxicillin
J01CA08 Pivmecillinam
J01CA11 Mecillinam
J01CA12 Piperacillin
J01CE
Beta-lactamase-sensitive
penicillins
J01CE01 Benzylpenicillin
J01CE02 Phenoxymethylpenicillin
J01CF
Beta-lactamase resistant
penicillins
J01CF01 Dicloxacillin
J01CF05 Flucloxacillin
J01CR
Combinations of penicillins
J01CR02 Amoxicillin and
enzyme inhibitor
J01CR05 Piperacillin and
enzyme inhibitor
Notes: Table A displays a detailed classification of the products considered in the analysis in terms of
their Anatomical Therapeutical Chemical classification code and the average number of products for
a period of 14-days in each molecule group for the base and the implementation period. Source for
classification: WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology.
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B. Estimation Results by Product Type
Original Generic Parallel
Products Products Imports
A. Anti-cholesterol
Reform -0.071*** -0.952*** -0.821***
(0.021) (0.112) (0.095)
# Products in 0.018*** -0.077*** -0.028***
subs. group (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Reform × # Products -0.014*** -0.054*** -0.101***
in subs. group (0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
Const 2.003*** 1.626*** 2.265***
(0.014) (0.108) (0.065)
N 2024 3760 1516
R2 0.226 0.312 0.554
B. Antiulcerants
Reform -0.153*** -0.289*** -0.210***
(0.012) (0.044) (0.017)
# Products in 0.005*** -0.088*** 0.003*
subs. group (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Reform × # Products 0.008*** -0.043*** 0.008***
in subs. group (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Const 2.356*** 1.388*** 2.352***
(0.008) (0.036) (0.014)
N 2032 5136 1603
R2 0.392 0.204 0.531
C. Antibiotics
Reform -0.017* 0.007 .
(0.009) (0.019) .
# Products in 0.031*** 0.004 0.006
subs. group (0.004) (0.006) -0.011
Reform × # Products -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.013**
in subs. group (0.002) (0.003) -0.005
Const 0.812*** -1.042*** 1.637***
(0.009) (0.018) -0.041
N 4536 2749 122
R2 0.116 0.109 0.876
Notes: Table B reports linear regression estimates of the coeffi-
cients in our pricing equation and summarizes the results by the
therapeutic market. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
estimation sample contains only the base and the implementa-
tion period. Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
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